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Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and 
Moral Discourse 
Carl E. Schneider* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The riddle of alimony is why one former spouse should have 
to support the other when no-fault divorce seems to establish 
the principle that marriage need not be for life and when gov-
ernmental regulation of intimate relationships is conventionally 
condemned. Perhaps the most intelligent and probing recent at-
tempt to solve that riddle is Ira Ellman's The Theory of Ali-
mony .1 In this article, I have two purposes. The first is to ask 
some questions about Professor Ellman's admirable inquiry into 
this intricate and intractable problem. These questions are not 
intended to disprove "the theory."2 Professor Ellman has, at the 
least, identified a number of ideas which should influence our 
thinking about alimony, and he has shown why a number of 
others probably should not. As he notes, in trying to solve the 
alimony riddle he has taken on a large project, a project which 
The Theory of Alimony only begins. I would like to contribute 
to that project by showing where the theory's rationale for ali-
mony falters and by proposing profitable directions for the in-
quiry Professor Ellman has so incisively begun. More generally, I 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. 
For the reasons given in Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U. Chicago 
L. Rev. 1343 (1986), I use the University of Chicago Manual of Legal Citation, id. at 
1353. As a great man once said, "Faites simple." I am enthusiastically grateful to the 
editors of the B.Y.U. Law Review for the uncommonly generous way in which they have 
accommodated my wish to strike a blow for freedom from the inanities and insanities of 
the Bluebook. 
This paper was originally presented at a Brigham Young University Symposium on 
Family Law. I wish to thank the participants in that symposium for their helpful com-
ments. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Edward H. Cooper, Joan W. Schneider, 
Kent D. Syverud, Carol Weisbrod, and.Barbara B. Woodhouse for their careful reading 
of an earlier draft of this article. 
1. Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1989). 
2. In order to avoid ceaseless incantations of Professor Ellman's name, I will hence-
forth frequently refer simply to "The Theory" or "the theory." 
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hope my investigation will identify some of the core difficulties 
any theory of alimony must confront. 3 
My second purpose in writing this article arises from the 
fact that perhaps solipsistically, I interpret Professor Ellman's 
project in light of an observation of my own. A few years ago, I 
argued that American family law has experienced "a diminution 
of the law's discourse in moral terms about the relations be-
tween family members, and the transfer of many moral decisions 
from the law to the people the law once regulated."4 Professor 
Ellman's enterprise speaks to this hypothesis in two ways. First, 
it centrally considers how far courts must undertake moral dis-
course in order to apply the currently popular approaches to ali-
mony. Second, it attempts to develop a theory of alimony which 
is justifiable in other than moral terms and which tries to relieve 
courts of the burden of moral discourse in deciding whether to 
award alimony.5 In my earlier article, I reached no conclusion 
about the ultimate practicality, much less the ultimate desirabil-
ity, of the trend away from moral discourse. While I cannot fully 
answer those two questions here, Professor Ellman's inquiry is 
an intriguing test case. The second half of this article thus ex-
plores in some detail the role of moral thinking in the law of 
alimony. During that exploration, I will express doubts about 
the success of any attempt to base a theory of alimony on mor-
ally "neutral" terms and of any attempt to bar courts from con-
sidering the moral relations of the parties in awarding alimony. 
II. PROFESSOR ELLMAN'S THEORY OF ALIMO~Y 
Professor Ellman begins by arguing that alimony has lost its 
rationale. The idea that divorced wives were entitled to alimony 
was sustained for generations by the belief that marriage com-
mitted a man to supporting his wife for the rest of her life. He 
3. I am delighted that Professor Ellman has agreed to respond in this symposium to 
this article. To avoid giving him a constantly moving target, and because I hope my 
comments will stand on their own, I have generally not tried to answer the points he 
makes in his response. I thus refer to his remarks only to help make my reasoning 
clearer. 
4. Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family 
Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1807-08 (1985). 
5. I am not suggesting that Professor Ellman approves of the trend; I don't know if 
he does. I am only saying that he seems to accept it for the purposes of trying to develop 
a theory of alimony which fits American family law as it now is. It seems to me that 
Professor Ellman has left himself entirely free to argue that the trend is incomplete and 
still leaves room for some kinds of moral discourse or even that the trend is undesirable. 
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could not escape that commitment by divorcing his wife, unless 
she seriously breached her marital responsibilities to him. How-
ever, as our ideas about what spouses promise each other and 
about gender roles have changed and as no-fault divorce has 
proliferated, the traditional rationale for alimony has crumbled. 
Today, "no one can explain convincingly who should be eligible 
to receive alimony, even though it remains in almost every juris-
diction" (pp. 4-5}.6 
Professor Ellman of course knows that modern defenders of 
alimony try to solve the riddle with either the law of contract or 
partnership. But he rejects both solutions. Contract law fails for 
several reasons. First, few couples actually enter express marital 
contracts, and even those couples that wish to do so often find 
that the law constrains them. Second, implied contracts are usu-
ally too partial and vague to be enforceable. And Professor Ell-
man sees a further drawback of looking to implied contracts. Be-
cause it is hard to imply a contract in the complex and fluid 
circumstances of a marriage, and because there are no generally 
accepted social standards which could be used in filling out the 
contract's terms, a court would be hard pressed to identify those 
terms without consulting its own views of marriage. Third, most 
implied contracts speak to the couple's relations during their 
marriage, not to their life afterwards. Thus those contracts can 
tell a court little about whether to award alimony. And, given 
the ambiguity of most such contracts, a court could not define 
"breach" without an inquiry which essentially resembled the in-
quest into marital fault which no-fault divorce rejects. Fourth, 
contract's measure of damages-expectation-produces awards 
which exceed all ordinary understandings of reasonable alimony. 
Fifth and finally, the semi-contractual analogy of restitution 
fails because it requires courts to inquire into highly ambiguous 
facts and to decide when a defendant's retention of the benefit 
the plaintiff conferred is unjust, which once again compels 
courts to inquire into "fault." 
Professor Ellman also rejects partnership law as an analogic 
basis for alimony. First, partnership law is designed only for 
businesses, that is, profit-seeking enterprises. But marriage is 
not in any ordinary sense such an enterprise, and it is generally 
organized on importantly different principles. Second, partner-
6. All references to page numbers are, of course, to The Theory of Alimony (cited in 
note 1). 
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ship law does not provide for anything like alimony. Third, 
while partnership law provides remedies for wrongful dissolu-
tion, for breaching the duty to serve the partnership, and for 
failing to compensate a partner who has provided the partner-
ship extraordinary services, each of these remedies requires the 
court to consult some normative standard of behavior which is 
available for partnerships (because they are businesses under-
taken for profit) but which are not available for marriages (as to 
which there are no universally accepted normative standards). 
· Having dispatched all the standard rationales for alimony, 
Professor Ellman turns to constructing his own. He begins by 
"looking at the commercial use of contract" in order to "identify 
the issues that commercial actors use contract to resolve-issues 
that in marriage are left to alimony" (p. 40). He suggests that 
when a supplier would have to make special capital expenditures 
in order to sell parts to IBM, the supplier will insist on a long-
term contract in order to protect those expenditures. He argues 
that a wife7 may find herself in the same situation as the sup-
plier, but may not be able to take advantage of the protections 
commercial law offers the supplier. That is, a wife may make 
investments which benefit the couple while they are together, 
but which deprive her of earning power after they divorce. Ex-
amples of such investments include abandoning a career in order 
to keep house or to bring up children or giving up some of her 
career opportunities so that her husband may take fuller advan-
tage of his. During the marriage these choices will often be eco-
nomically rational, since they may increase the couple's joint in-
come more than any alternative allocation of their efforts. But 
after divorce, they may leave the wife with diminished, and the 
husband with increased, earning capacity. In analogous circum-
stances, the parts supplier would protect its investment contrac-
tually. But the "indefinite nature of the parties' marital obliga-
tions" (p. 44) prevents the wife from devising a contract which 
would similarly protect her investment. 
The wife's inability to protect herself through such a con-
tract is the problem alimony solves: the "loss that alimony is 
7. Professor Ellman writes, "Recognizing this reality [that "alimony claims are in 
fact overwhelmingly brought by women against men"], and to avoid tedious language, I 
often use the term 'wife' and its referent pronoun 'her' as a shorthand for the spouse 
with an alimony claim" (p. 4, n.2). For Professor Ellman's reasons, and for the sake of 
clarity and consistency, I will follow his practice. 
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intended to compensate for . . . is the 'residual' loss8 in earning 
capacity that arises from . . . economically rational marital 
sharing behavior" (p. 49). By assuring the wife that her economi-
cally rational investments will be protected, alimony protects 
her from a loss of earning power arising out of such investments 
in the marriage. Alimony thus prevents "distorting incentives" 
(p. 50) from skewing marital decisions and "maximizes the par-
ties' freedom to shape their marriage in accordance with their 
nonfinancial preferences" (p. 51). That is, "[a] system of ali-
mony that compensates the wife who has disproportionate post-
marriage losses arising from her marital investment protects 
marital decisionmaking from the potentially destructive pres-
sures of a market that does not value marital investment as 
much as it values career enhancement" (p. 51). Under this the-
ory, alimony is "an entitlement earned through marital invest-
ment, and . . . a tool to eliminate distorting financial incentives, 
. . . not a way of relieving need" (p. 52). 
Professor Ellman proffers several rules for implementing his 
theory. First, alimony is to be awarded only where the wife suf-
fered. a loss in her post-marriage earning capacity because of an 
investment in the marriage. Second, "only financially rational 
sharing behavior can qualify as such marital investment," (p. 58) 
and the wife may obtain alimony only where the investment was 
successful. Third, the wife may recover half her lost earning ca-
pacity even though her investment was not financially rational 
where the investment included primary responsibility for bring-
ing up the couple's children, since "[p]arental care is ... not 
merely a life-style preference but a traditional ideal" (p. 72) and 
since "society relies for its continued existence on couples who 
make just this financially irrational choice" (p. 71). 
III. ExAMINING THE THEORY 
The Theory of Alimony is rich in virtues, and it contributes 
abundantly to our understanding of alimony. First, it argues 
forcefully what is painfully true-that we need a theory of ali-
mony before we can devise sensible rules for it9 and that we 
quite lack one. Second, Professor Ellman convincingly demon-
8. "This is a residual loss in the sense that it survives the marriage" (p. 49). 
9. For a general argument in favor of just such theory-building, see Carl E. Schnei-
der, The Next Step: Definition, Generalization, and Theory in American Family Law, 18 
U. Mich. J. L. Reform 1039 (1985). 
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strates some of the drawbacks of both contract and partnership 
law as a basis for such a theory. He accurately points out many 
of the weaknesses of the ideas about implied contract which un-
dergird much current thinking about alimony (and about Mar-
vin remedies);10 he neatly shows that partnership law's reper-
toire is too small and too closely tailored to profit-making to 
< solve the alimony riddle.11 Third, The Theory identifies a kind 
of marital investment which seems a genuinely attractive candi-
date for alimonial protection: major changes of economic posi-
tion which after divorce benefit one spouse and disadvantage the 
other. Fourth, Professor l~llman's attitude is entirely attractive: 
he seems refreshingly interested in following his ideas wherever 
they may lead him; he does not merely try to justify conclusions 
he has already reached on unrevealed grounds. Consequently, 
his arguments are carefullly stated and honestly explored. 
However, it would be startling indeed if anyone could solve 
so challenging a riddle in one attempt. I will now explore some 
of the problems I see witlh Professor Ellman's theory. My explo-
ration will be in two stages. In the first stage (Part III of the 
article), I will analyze the theory on its own terms. That is, I will 
ask how well the theory serves its purpose of creating incentives 
that correctly influence marital decisions and of removing incen-
tives that "distort" them. I will find reason to fear that the the-
ory's incentives will in fact not affect marital behavior at all. I 
will argue that the structure and functioning of the theory's in-
centives are flawed because the theory isolates one transaction 
from the whole range of marital decisions, and I will question 
whether courts could satisfactorily make the calculations the 
theory calls for. Behind these specific arguments lie two general 
ones. First, Professor Ellman's solution is problematic because it 
relies so heavily on economic reasoning, while people do not view 
marriage entirely in terms of economic advantage, and we do not 
want them to. Second, Professor Ellman's solution to the riddle 
of alimony is problematic even as an economic theory because 
his effort to create a manageable justification for alimony forces 
10. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Calif. 1976). Marvin held that unmarried 
couples could contractually decide how their property was to be allocated and what sup-
port obligations might exist after their relationship had ended (at least to the extent that 
the contract was not explicitly based on meretricious services). It also held that courts 
might make such decisions for the couple where equitable grounds existed for doing so. 
11. While I find much to agree with in Professor Ellman's criticisms of contract as a 
sole and complete rationale for our present alimony regime, I would not reject the possi-
bility that contract might be a bru:.is for a reformed law of alimony and marital property. 
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him to ignore too many concerns that are as much economic as 
those the theory relies on. 
However, I will postpone until the second stage (Part IV of 
the article) my comments on the theory's desirability. And even 
there I will not try to propose my own global theory of alimony. 
Rather, I will contend that Professor Ellman's theory seems to 
award alimony in one important category of cases where alimony 
should be awarded, but that it fails to award alimony in anum-
ber of cases that seem just as meritorious and that it could 
award alimony in some cases that seem unmeritorious. And I 
will argue that, in order to succeed either in creating the right 
incentive structure for marital decisions or in settling alimony 
disputes fairly, a theory of alimony must take into account the 
moral relations of the parties. 
In Part IV, I will also use the theory as a vehicle for evalu-
ating the trend toward a diminution in moral discourse in family 
law. I will argue first that it is not possible to justify a theory of 
alimony in morally neutral terms. And, I will argue, courts 
resolving disputes over alimony need to be able to take the 
moral relations of the parties into account, since those relations 
will often be central to understanding the parties' behavior and 
to doing justice in resolving their dispute. As I will say later, 
"[T]he people the law seeks to affect think in moral terms. A 
law which tries to eliminate those terms from its language will 
both misunderstand the people it is regulating and be misunder-
stood by them." I will acknowledge that there are reasons we 
might want to restrict judicial inquiries into the parties' moral 
relations, but I will suggest that these reasons are not 
dispositive. 
A. Alimony and the Hortatory Function: Or, Who Listens to 
the Law? 
Some years ago, Professor P. S. Atiyah said that the judicial 
process serves 
two main functions. In the first place it provides a means of 
settling disputes by fair and peaceful procedures, a function 
which may be variously termed that of conflict-adjustment or 
dispute-settlement. In the second place the judicial process is 
part of a complex set of arrangements designed to provide in-
centives and disincentives for various types of behaviour . . . . 
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There is no simple or agreed term for this aspect of the judicial 
function which I propose to call the hortatory function. 12 
Alimony has ordinarily been considered part of the dispute-set-
tlement function of law. Divorcing spouses disagree about who 
owes what to whom, and a court resolves the dispute by ordering 
or not ordering alimony. The court seeks to do justice between 
the parties by examining their present situation and their rela-
tionship during the marriage. The court has commonly not been 
expected to calculate how its decision might affect the behavior 
of married couples generally.13 
Although Professor Ellman does not quite say so, perhaps 
The Theory of Alimony's most original contribution is to pro-
pose that alimony should instead be seen primarily in terms of 
the hortatory function. At the theory's core is the principle that 
the "function of alimony . . . is to reallocate the post-divorce 
financial consequences of marriage in order to prevent distorting 
incentives" (p. 50). While The Theory argues that its system is 
"consistent with equitable notions," it rests principally not on 
those notions, but rather on the "proposition that marital in-
vestment decisions should be free from potentially distorting 
penalties and incentives" (p. 51). The Theory emphasizes this 
point by insisting that its system "is fundamentally different 
from contract analysis," since contract analysis looks backward 
to fashion a remedy for violated promises, while the theory 
"looks forward; it generates alimony rules that encourage the 
kind of marital behavior we want" (pp. 51-52). 
If the theory of alimony is essentially hortatory, if it seeks 
primarily to alter the incentives which affect marital decisions 
rather than to arrange the affairs of a divorced couple as equita-
bly as possible (or to carry out the couple's contractual agree-
ments), then we need first to ask whether the theory can effec-
tively serve the hortatory function. Will the theory's incentives 
12. P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the 
Judicial Process and the Law, 65 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1249 (1980). In my own work, I have 
called this function of law the "channelling" function. The Jaw performs the channelling 
function by creating or (more often) supporting social institutions and practice>:; which 
are thought to promote desirable ends and then by channelling people into using those 
institutions or practices. See Carl E. Schneider, Family Law (forthcoming). 
13. Because this is an article about the principles that ought to govern alimony, I 
have been talking in terms of what courts do. In fact, however, it is conventionally be-
lieved that the large majority of divorce disputes (perhaps as many as 90 percent) are 
not litigated. Rather, they are thought to be negotiated by the parties and rubber-
stamped by courts that are too busy to examine divorce settlements closely. 
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have the intended effect on the spouses' behavior? Will they 
have any effect on it? 
In gauging the hortatory effect of a system of alh:nony, I 
think we must begin with a skepticism born of our accumulating 
knowledge about how well people know the civil law and how far 
they consider it in making decisions. There is a growing body of 
evidence that people live in (to a lawyer) dismaying ignorance of 
and indifference to the incentives and penalties legal rules strive 
to create. Even businessmen, who would seem to have the so-
phistication and incentives to learn and use the law's tools, ap-
parently ignore them startlingly often. Indeed, people often 
seem actively and deliberately to resist the law's norms, particu-
larly when, as regularly happens, those norms conflict with other 
social norms. 14 
Not only should we generally question legal reforms that as-
sume that people shape their behavior in response to legal incen-
tives, but we should be particularly skeptical of reforms that 
seek to affect marital decisions of the kind The Theory treats. 
There are several reasons such marital decisions may be particu-
larly impervious to the law's incentives. One reason is that 
couples don't know what the law's incentives are. Direct evi-
dence of this comes from an empirical study of knowledge about 
the law of alimony, marital property, and child support which 
finds 
the ordinary person to have scant knowledge of the terms of 
the marriage contract as defined by the statutory laws regulat-
ing divorce. Even individuals with substantial rational incen-
tives to know those laws well, in fact know little. Thus, mar-
riage appears to be a contract whose statutory terms are 
typically "discovered" by the parties (if at all) only when 
things begin to go wrong, and whose full import is revealed 
only after a judge has spoken at divorce or the parties have 
settled in the light of their guess about how a judge would de-
cide contested issues.111 
14. The locus classicus of this view is Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations 
in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963). Another fine statement of 
it is Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in 
Shasta County, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 623 (1986). See generally, Carl E. Schneider, Social 
Structure and Social Control: On The Moral Order of a Suburb, 24 Law & Society Rev. 
875 (1990). 
15. Lynn A. Baker & Robert Emery, When Homo Economicus Marries: An Empiri-
cal Study 7 (unpublished manuscript). 
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And even couples who know what the law of divorce is often will 
ignore it because they believe that they will never get divorced 
and thus will never be subject to it.16 As Professor Ellman points 
out, "[p]eople generally enter and conduct marriages on the as-
sumption that they will endure ... "(p. 15).17 
Nor are couples who ignore the law regulating the econom-
ics of divorce necessarily foolish. For one thing, even on the 
bleakest view of divorce statistics, half the couples who believe 
they will never be divorced are right. For another thing, it is far 
from safe for couples to rely on the law of divorce. Where one or 
both of the spouses moves out of the state in which the relevant 
decision was made, the couple may find themselves subject to a 
new (and possibly quite different) divorce law. Even if the 
spouses never move, their own state legislature or courts may 
alter-radically-that state's law of divorce.18 Even if the law re-
mains stable, the couple's situation at that point in the indefi-
nite future when the law would be applied to them is likely to be 
so unpredictable that they could not adequately anticipate how 
the law would affect them.19 In addition, couples may rationally 
conclude that, given the plenitude of factors that will affect deci-
sions about their economic affairs, the information costs of get-
ting reliable (and regularly updated) advice about what their 
state's law might be at an uncertain time in the future would be 
unjustifiably high. 
There is yet a further reason why couples might not want to 
consider the law of alimony in making marital decisions and 
even why the law might not want to encourage them to do so. 
16. Professors Baker and Emery write, 
By systematically viewing themselves as unrepresentative of the population at 
large, that is, by ignoring base rates, young adults preserve a romantic view of 
marriage that makes knowledge of the law personally irrelevant. Perhaps be-
cause individuals believe that they have found "true love" or are confident that 
they will "work harder" at their marriage, divorce does not matter and the 
statutory terms of the marriage contract can be ignored. 
ld. at 90. 
17. This is why, Professor Ellman suggests, couples have not widely taken advantage 
of the expanded scope of marital contracting. 
18. This is a lesson which any couple watching the no-fault revolution and its ac-
companying changes in the law of alimony, marital property, child custody, and child 
support should have learned well. Indeed, as Carol Weisbrod observed to me, the central 
(and popularly recognized) lesson of no-fault divorce is probably that the rules of divorce 
can change drastically at any moment. 
19. The Theory itself makes something like this point when it argues that a wife 
cannot protect her investment "because of the indefinite nature of the parties' marital 
obligations" (p. 44). 
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Couples might well feel that getting advice about how each 
would fare individually in a divorce would represent a kind of 
betrayal of their commitment to their marriage. Getting such 
advice might seem to say that they did not regard their marriage 
as genuinely permanent and did not trust each other to reach a 
just settlement of their financial affairs if it ever ended. Getting 
such advice might seem to imply that they were thinking of 
themselves as separate individuals, even as self-interested bar-
gainers, rather than as a marital entity. One spouse's suggestion 
that such information be acquired might thus dismay the other 
spouse and even disconcert the spouse who made the suggestion. 
For all these reasons, then, spouses might rationally prefer sim-
ply not to inquire into the law of alimony. 
Even if spouses know the law of alimony, it is unlikely to 
govern their behavior, since it is apt to be swamped by so many 
other things. When husbands and wives make decisions, they are 
surely affected by their personal long- and short-term economic 
interests. But they are also influenced, and usually more impor-
tantly influenced, by their family's economic interests, by the ec-
onomic interests of each other and their children (as many 
purchases of life insurance attest). They think about things be-
sides money: How will our decision affect our careers, our plans 
to have children, our chances to spend time with our children, 
our children's education, our love for each other, our ability to 
go back to school, our choice of where to live, our religious obli-
gations, our social status, our relations with our friends, our du-
ties to our aging parents, our promises to each other in the past, 
our hopes for each other in the future? Husbands and wives 
brood about the exigencies of the quotidian: How will a decision 
affect getting to work in the morning, picking up the children at 
daycare in the evening, or playing softball with the team at 
night? They are influenced by things unseen: Le coeur a ses 
raisons que la raison ne connaU point. Thus spouses are swayed 
by their shifting moods, by their emotional natures, by their 
pulling and tugging for power, by their yearning to avoid deci-
sions, by the habits, traditions, sympathies, spites, irritations, 
understandings, accommodations, and affections of a life long 
lived together. All these and much else besides influence a fam-
ily's decisions. It is a bold thing to suppose that the law of ali-
mony will figure largely among them. 20 
20. As I argue in Part IV, we might want to provide alimonial relief for marital 
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In short, our first problem with The Theory is that its pri-
mary purpose is to create incentives, yet its incentives seem 
likely to go unnoticed or unheeded by the people they are in-
tended to influence. Let us for the moment assume, however, 
that the theory will have some effect on incentives. Will it have 
the intended effects? To have the intended effects, the theory 
must be fully and accurately communicated to spouses. Further, 
if they are to act in reliance on the theory, spouses must be con-
fident that courts will apply it correctly. But the theory on its 
face is not simple, and as I will argue later, it would be hard to 
apply. These facts would impair both communication of the the-
ory and confidence in its application. Particularly since most 
people learn about the law of divorce from colorful but mislead-
ing reports in the press and from equally unreliable war stories 
from friends, couples would easily be led to misunderstand or 
mistrust the theory. For example, one might readily imagine a 
wife making a sacrifice she otherwise would not have made be-
cause she thought she would be reimbursed when in fact she 
would not be because the sacrifice was not economically rational. 
One might equally well imagine a wife refusing to make a sacri-
fice that would benefit her and her family because she lacked 
confidence that a court would recognize her sacrifice as an "in-
vestment" and would accurately calculate the value of her lost 
earning capacity. Similarly, a husband might refuse to accept his 
wife's sacrifice, on the (in principle erroneous) view that the 
family's extra income would not be justified by the risk he per-
ceived he was running of high life-long personalliability.21 
In sum, then, there is a vital difficulty with a law of alimony 
whose purpose is hortatory: The law cannot affect behavior un-
less it can make itself heard and understood and can offer incen-
tives or disincentives strong enough to compete with the other 
incentives people face. My first doubt about Professor Ellman's 
theory is whether it meets this test. This is not to suggest that 
the law of alimony can never affect marital behavior, though I 
suspect it will always have difficulty in doing so. It is to say that 
investments even if people make those investments without incentives because fairness 
between the parties requires it. But The Theory is not based (at least primarily) on such 
an argument. Rather, it rests on the arguments about incentives which we are 
investigating. 
21. Some of these results might be socially desirable, but they are not desirable 
under the theory. 
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this particular theory is so narrow in its effects and so complex 
in its workings that I doubt it will change the·way couples act.22 
B. The Supplier and the Wife 
1. Is the analogy accurate? 
Even if The Theory's incentives would be detected, heeded, 
understood, and believed, we still need to ask whether they are 
necessary. The theory rests on the need to eliminate "distor-
tions" in particular marital decisions. But to the extent those 
distortions are not presently occurring, the theory's new incen-
tives are presumably less necessary. Are marital decisions in fact 
being distorted by the present law of alimony in the way The 
Theory assumes? This is, of course, a question that cannot be 
answered without empirical evidence which we lack. However, 
the anecdotal evidence of the cases and, I suspect, the experi-
ence of most of the people reading this article suggest that hus-
bands and wives already do invest greatly in their marriages 
without the theory's incentives. 23 Indeed, I would suppose that 
one spur to alimony reform might be the sense that wives partic-
ularly have too often invested in that way and then been left 
impoverished after divorce. 
The possibility that couples may be making the investments 
which The Theory seeks to encourage even without the benefit 
of the theory's incentives invites us to look more closely at the 
22. I have been expressing doubts that the theory's law of alimony would greatly 
affect the behavior of most spouses. I have not, of course, been arguing that the law can 
never have any effect on human behavior. Surely it can and does. Professor Ellman's 
article in this symposium notes that David Chambers has shown that the law can en-
hance the willingness of fathers to pay child support. Making Fathers Pay: The Enforce-
ment of Child Support (1979). But that example seems to me to confirm the law's weak-
ness rather than to demonstrate its strength: Litigants and courts trying to collect child 
support are working under relatively favorable circumstances. They are trying to make 
specific, identifiable individuals do a specific, concrete thing in the immediate present. 
They are able to use the law's strongest sanctions-issuing orders diverting income from 
employee-obligors and sending them to jail. Yet even with these powerful advantages, 
the law fails to obtain its money in a troubling proportion of cases. And for the reasons I 
have just canvassed, the law is trying to do something exceedingly more difficult in using 
alimony hortatorily. 
23. Of course, there is no way of knowing how many more spouses would invest in 
their marriages given the theory's incentives. And, of course, it is possible to argue that 
such investments should be recompensed even though they were made without any ex-
pectation of compensation. But, again, this is an argument about fairness in dispute set-
tlement, not an argument about the hortatory function of alimony on which the theory 
rests. 
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incentive structure The Theory sees in the present law of ali-
mony and the ones it seeks to establish. The key to understand-
ing those incentives lies in The Theory's central example of the 
company that supplies specialized parts to IBM and that cannot 
supply those parts without making capital investments that will 
be lost if IBM stops buying the parts too soon. Professor Ellman 
compares the supplier's situation with that of a wife who wishes 
to invest in her marriage by sacrificing her own earning power in 
ways that increase the couple's total income while they are mar-
ried but that will leave the wife with only her reduced earning 
power after a divorce. The Theory argues that both the wife and 
the parts supplier are making "investments a self-interested bar-
gainer would make only in return for'a long-term commitment" 
(p. 42). However, while the parts supplier can protect itself 
through a long-term contract, the wife cannot do so because the 
"indefinite nature of the parties' marital obligations . . . defeats 
ex post judicial efforts to reconstruct implied contracts" and 
"prevents most spouses from working out express agreements ex 
ante" (p. 44).24 
How compelling is the analogy of the parts supplier? It 
seems to me to present two problems. First, The Theory may 
not accurately describe the situation of the parts supplier. Sec-
ond, the wife's situation may not be wholly similar to the parts 
supplier's. 
As to the first point, The Theory assumes that the supplier 
would not invest the capital necessary to provide parts to IBM 
without a long-term contract which would ensure it of recouping 
its investment. However, the supplier might be willing to invest 
the capital without such a contract if the return on its invest-
ment were high enough to justify the extra risk. That return 
might be of two kinds. First, it could be the high price per unit 
which IBM might pay in order to avoid a long-term commitment 
and to do business with a particularly attractive supplier. Sec-
ond, it might be the supplier's chance (even if not the guaran-
tee) of developing a good relationship with a new customer. That 
is, the supplier's risk would buy it a chance it might otherwise 
not have to develop a highly (perhaps uniquely) desirable cus-
tomer which was tied to the supplier by an established track rec-
24. Professor Ellman notes that "[s]imilar difficulties explain why the law aban-
doned rather than refined fault-based adjudications" (p. 45). 
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ord and by the mutual reliance, understanding, and comfort 
which can grow between a customer and a supplier over time. 
The wife might well calculate that she could get returns on 
her investment that would be analogous to the two kinds of re-
turns to the supplier I just described. First, her sacrifice of earn-
ing power might so much increase her husband's income that 
she might conclude that the economic benefits to her during the 
marriage outweighed her possible loss in the event of divorce. 
She might also calculate that the economic benefits of the sacri-
fice would result in an accumulation of marital pr~perty great 
enough that her share on divorce would recompense her for her 
investment. And she might feel that the immediate non-financial 
rewards of the marriage were great enough to recompense her 
for the risk of reduced earning power should the marriage end. 
Second, the wife might feel that the risks of her investment were 
justified by the possibility that it would help build a marriage 
with a particularly desirable partner which would ultimately be 
lasting and rewarding. 
My first point about the analogy to the supplier .has been 
that the supplier might not need to protect itself in the way The 
Theory supposes. My second point about it is that the wife may 
be differently situated from the supplier. For instance, the sup-
plier in The Theory must make all its investment up front; the 
entire investment immediately becomes a sunk cost. This is not 
true of most of the investments The Theory contemplates the 
wife making. Those investments are typically decisions not to 
pursue a career or not to pursue it ambitiously. The less time 
that expires between the sacrifice and the divorce, the easier it 
will presumably be for the wife to resume her career without 
major loss. The wife will often not make a single, fixed-cost in-
vestment. Rather she will gradually decide not to start law 
school this year, but to put it off until next year, or perhaps the 
year after, or maybe the year after that. One might conclude 
from this that, if the divorce occurs soon after the sacrifice, the 
wife will usually have lost little; if it happens long after the sac-
rifice, she will have had the advantage of the increased familial 
earnings during the marriage. Neither of these situations may 
provide the wife a fully satisfactory remedy, but both differ from 
the bleaker picture drawn in the contrast between the wife and 
the supplier, and both call into question the need to avoid the 
"distorting" incentives which the theory hypothesizes. 
There may be other important differences between the wife 
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and the supplier. For instance, while the supplier is, as Professor 
Ellman says, a "self-interested bargainer" (p. 42), the wife may 
not be. Indeed, perhaps she ought not be. She will be interested 
in the welfare of her husband for his own sake, because she loves 
him, and for the sake of her children, because she loves them. 
She may therefore want to make a sacrifice for her husband or 
her children that is in the nature of a gift. She might even say 
that, for the law to hold her harmless for that gift changes the 
nature of the gift in a way that makes it less meaningful both to 
her that gives and them that take. Or the point can be put dif-
ferently. One might say that her utility is immediately increased 
by giving her husband or children a gift, so that the wife is get-
ting an immediate return on her investment in the form of the 
gratification that comes from giving the gift. 
Even if the wife is a "self-interested bargainer," she differs 
from the supplier in another important way. The Theory as-
sumes that the supplier is interested solely in economic profit. 
Even if this is true of the supplier (and there is reason to think 
that business managers are motivated by many things besides 
economic profit, like the size and prestige of their firms), it is 
unlikely to be true of the wife. All the wife's choices about work-
ing and its alternatives will have important non-economic as-
pects. This creates a number of difficulties for the theory. For 
example, The Theory generally assumes that working at a job is 
something that people want to do (since it produces income), 
and that they would give up well-paying jobs only for some 
other way of earning income (as by increasing a spouse's earning 
power so that the family's wealth is maximized). But for many 
people the assumption is, for a variety of reasons, false. Many 
people dislike many kinds of work. They may be glad not to 
work, particularly if they have alternatives they regard as more 
gratifying, even if not more lucrative. 
Consider a couple who both feel this way about employ-
ment. Suppose that the wife does not enjoy her job, that she 
finds rewards in being a housewife, and that she enjoys the cul-
tural activities that she can pursue when she is not employed 
outside the house. Suppose that the husband does enjoy his job 
as a law professor and that he is offered a position in a New 
York law firm which win immeasurably increase his income but 
which will also require him to do disagreeable work, to work 
harder and longer, to be away from home a good deal more, to 
move to a city he detests, and to run the risk that he may be 
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unable to return to teaching after too many years away from it. 
Suppose further that the wife is intensely anxious to move to 
New York, her childhood home and the city of her dreams. Sup-
pose finally that it would be economically rational for her to give 
up her job to stay home and take care of the house so that her 
husband could take the job in New York. The wife's agreement 
to do so stops looking like a sacrifice by the wife that benefits 
the husband and might even begin to look like a sacrifice by the 
husband that benefits the wife.25 
Professor Ellman, of course, knows that "some spouses who 
leave the marketplace to become full-time homemakers will be 
doing exactly what they want" (p. 52, n. 146). But he argues that 
the wife's reason for leaving the marketplace has "no bearing on 
the question of whether the adjustment should be considered 
marital investment ... " (p. 52, n. 146). This argument seems to 
fit awkwardly with Professor Ellman's justification for his the-
ory. There are two reasons for this. 
First, the theory's rationale for alimony rests on the analogy 
to the situation of the supplier. And in the hypothetical I have 
just posed, that analogy looks weak. The supplier's immediate 
motive for !!laking its special capital investment is to increase its 
earnings by selling parts to IBM. In my hypothetical, the wife's 
motive may be partly to increase the family income, but it seems 
awkward to say that she "has sacrificed some career prospects to 
invest instead in her marriage" (p. 47). Rather, she is getting 
something she immediately wants-to be able to leave the job 
market and spend time in cultural pursuits. She may be gam-
bling that the benefit of not having to work and of being able to 
spend her time in other ways will not have been bought at the 
cost of later wanting but lacking enhanced earning ability. Fur-
ther, it seems awkward to think of the husband as being in the 
position of IBM--of extracting something from the supplier that 
it does not want to give (the capital investment necessary to 
meet IBM's specifications) for IBM's own profit. He may rather 
have been the person from whom something was extracted that 
he did not want to give (moving to a job and city he disliked). 
Second, the theory's rationale for alimony rests on the de-
sire to eliminate "distorting" incentives and penalties. But to 
25. Let me repeat that, as I said in note 6, I am for the sake of clarity and consis-
tency following Professor Ellman's practice of referring to the claimant for alimony as 
the wife. 
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say that we have to create an incentive to marital sharing (in the 
form of giving up working) to encourage people like the wife in 
the hypothetical to feel safe in giving up a job seems unsatisfac-
tory. Far from encouraging marital sharing, it seems to en-
courage its opposite. It allows the wife to follow her inclination 
not to work while requiring the husband to insure that she not 
be injured by her choice, even though the husband did not want 
to take on the extra burdens needed to enhance his earning 
power (and might even want to give up that enhanced power to 
return to teaching if the couple divorced). 
My criticisms of the analogy to the supplier are not in-
tended to show that the theory which rests on that analogy is 
wholly misconceived. But they suggest that the situations of 
both the supplier and the wife are importantly more compli-
cated than The Theory allows and that the analogy provides a 
weaker base for alimony than The Theory supposes. More spe-
cifically, the supplier might be willing to enter into the relation-
ship with IBM without the contract which The Theory assumes 
would be necessary, and thus the wife might also rationally in-
vest in her marriage without the incentive The Theory would 
create. In addition, the wife is differently situated from the sup-
plier in ways that may sometimes make it less necessary that she 
be given an incentive for marital sharing through some substi-
tute for a contract. In short, seen in terms of the law's hortatory 
function, the theory seems to overstate the need for the kind of 
alimony it would allow.26 
2. Is the measure of damages correct? 
Despite what I have argued so far, let us assume arguendo 
that couples will know and heed the law of alimony, that the 
analogy to the supplier works, and that spouses need an 
alimonial incentive to allow them to sacrifice their earning po-
tential to maximize their family's income. What ought that in-
centive be? The Theory's answer, of course, is that spouses 
should recoup their lost earning capacity. Is that the incentive 
that best accords with the theory's logic? 
To answer this question, we must return to The Theory's 
26. In addition, seen in terms of the law's dispute·settlement function, the theory 
leads to results whose fairness seems at least disputable, since the theory calls for com· 
pensation where it is the husband rather than the wife who apparently made the 
sacrifice. 
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central analogy to the parts supplier. The Theory, as we have 
seen, reasons that the supplier would protect itself with a long-
term contract before making the capital investment necessary to 
enable it to supply parts to IBM, but that a wife investing in her 
husband's career cannot similarly protect herself. Alimony's pur-
pose, then, is to imply by law a contract the wife cannot make 
for herself. "[T]o protect her marital investment and thereby 
encourage her to make it, we must provide the wife with an 
equivalent noncontractual remedy" (p. 54). All this seems to 
suggest that the wife's remedy should be the same as the sup-
plier's-the traditional contract measure of damages, which is of 
course expectation. 
The Theory rejects that measure on the ground that "a con-
tract claimant receives nothing without first establishing that 
the other party breached; in alimony we will not ask why the 
marriage ended or whether the claimant bears some fault for the 
divorce" (p. 66).27 Let us postpone until Part IV the conclusion 
that we are barred from asking why the marriage ended. Given 
the purpose of alimony-to prevent the distortion of decisions 
about investments in marriages-is expectation the correct mea-
sure of damages? On one view, it seems to be. To see why, let us 
look again at the case of the supplier. The supplier will not sell 
parts to IBM unless it is assured an adequate return. How do we 
know what that adequate return is? We could require courts to 
decide that question for themselves case by case. But the diffi-
culty and inefficiency of such a method have (in part) led to the 
irrebuttable presumption that the adequate return is whatever 
the parties bargained for. Hence expectation is the standard 
measure of damages in contract law. 
Similarly, The Theory assumes that the wife will not sacri-
fice her earning capacity for the sake of a larger family income 
unless she is assured an adequate return. We have no way of 
knowing what kind of return she would regard as minimally ade-
quate. Thus, on the analogy to the supplier, we would ask what 
her actions suggest she regarded as adequate, and look to what 
she bargained for, i.e., her expectation. 
It might seem that the wife ought to regard as yielding an 
adequate return any investment that The Theory considers eco-
27. The Theory also argues that "to measure that claim by the spouse's lost expec-
tation might induce one spouse to terminate the marriage since she would receive the 
expected financial gain from her marital investment without remaining married" (p. 66). 
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nomically rational, that is, any sacrifice of earning capacity that 
yields her a dollar more than she could earn by refusing to sacri-
fice her earning capacity. This is because the wife is presumably 
economically better off after any such investment. Since it ought 
to take no more than such a gain to induce the wife to make the 
sacrifice, one might conclude that she need be given no more 
than an equivalent amount-a restoration of her lost earning ca-
pacity plus one dollar-in damages. But even if the wife were 
thinking in purely economic terms, she might not regard the dol-
lar as an adequate inducement to make the investment, if only 
because she might regard the return as too small to justify the 
risks associated with the investment. In addition, of course, the 
wife will inevitably be influenced by a host of non-economic con-
siderations (including, for example, her reluctance to sacrifice 
the personal and social rewards she receives from her career), 
many of which may induce her to require a large return on her 
investment. Both the economic and the non-economic factors 
may loom large in the wife's calculations. But they will do so in 
complex ways that will differ from person to person. Thus, if our 
goal is to make it as safe for the wife as the supplier to make a 
long-term investment, it would seem we should offer both the 
same return-what each expected. Because the theory would 
only restore to the wife her lost earning capacity and would not 
assure her the economic gains she expected from her investment, 
the theory seems likely to undercompensate her in terms of its 
own rationale. 
On the other hand, The Theory's method of calculating 
damages could also sometimes give the wife a greater return 
than the theory calls for-i.e., a return great enough to induce 
the wife to make the investment. To see why, let us return to 
the analogy to the supplier. The wife's implied contract should 
do no more than the supplier's contract would do-allow her to 
recoup her investment and receive a reasonable return on it. In 
what form would the supplier expect to recoup its investment? 
In the form of regular payments for the parts supplied. And in 
what form does the theory assume the wife expects to recoup her 
investment? In the form of the extra income brought in from the 
husband's increased earning power. If the increase in earning 
power is great, the wife may fully recoup her investment and her 
reasonable return on her investment even before the divorce. 
She would then, on the analogy to the supplier or in terms of 
what it would take to induce her to make the investment, not be 
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entitled to or require the further compensation the theory con-
templates. In the theory's terms, the wife's loss would no longer 
be "a residual loss in the sense that it survives the marriage" (p. 
49). 
In short, The Theory's method of calculating alimony could 
overcompensate a claimant because, by excluding benefits accru-
ing to her from the sacrifice during marriage, it ignores a stan-
dard way she is compensated for that sacrifice. To put the point 
in terms of the theory's central analogy, its method is akin to 
allowing the supplier to sue IBM on their long-term contract but 
barring IBM from introducing into evidence the payments it had 
made on that contract. 
The Theory's method of calculating damages may, certainly, 
sometimes yield a rough measure of what it would take to make 
the wife's investment safe. But I have argued that, considered in 
terms of the law's hortatory function, the method seems suscep-
tible to two kinds of errors-first, that it may in some cases offer 
too little to create an incentive to marital sharing, second that it 
may in some cases offer more than would be necessary to create 
such an incentive. 
Professor Ellman's theory of alimony rests primarily on the 
need to create a system of incentives which would encourage a 
certain kind of marital investment. Thus far, we have raised sev-
eral questions about those incentives. We have suggested rea-
sons to be concerned about whether the incentives would be rec-
ognized, whether they would be heeded, and whether they would 
be correctly understood. We have found infirmities in the anal-
ogy on which the argument for the incentives rests. And we have 
wondered whether the remedies the theory proposes accurately 
serve alimony's hortatory function. We now need to ask whether 
the theory's incentive structure is socially and normatively 
desirable. 
C. Evaluating the Theory's Incentive Structure 
Most readers of The Theory of Alimony are likely to be im-
mediately surprised at the narrow scope of alimony under its 
rules. It singles out one of the many kinds of marital decisions 
-a spouse's financially rational sacrifice of earning capacity--
and provides that inefficiencies arising out of that particular de-
cision and that decision only shall be repaired on divorce. 28 On 
28. As I noted in summarizing the theory, it also awards alimony in one class of· 
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further reflection, readers may also be struck by the way in 
which that decision is abstracted from the context in which it is 
made and treated in isolation from the entirety of the marriage. 
In what follows, I will ask whether the theory's goal is appropri-
ate, why the theory gives relief on divorce for only one kind of 
investment, and whether that relief can be properly calculated 
outside of the larger context of the marriage. 
The Theory's purpose is to remove "distorting" incentives 
and penalties from marital decisions. But what is being dis-
torted? The answer seems to be decisions to maximize family 
income where the wife has an economic incentive (the fear of 
lost earning power after divorce) to refuse to make the "'ra-
tional' choice of maximizing the marital income" (p. 47) by sac-
rificing some of her career interests.29 Thus when Professor Ell-
man speaks of "adopt[ing] suboptimal marital patterns" (p. 50), 
he is speaking of failing to maximize the family's income. But 
why is optimizing family income so crucial a goal that it ought to 
be the only basis (along with recompensing some kinds of sacri-
fices by a parent caring for children) for alimony? As The The-
ory properly acknowledges in criticizing the analogy of alimony 
law to partnership law, "[w]hile many marriages are 'profit-shar-
ing' in the sense that the parties intend to share their economic 
success, they are not 'profit-seeking' in the sense that financial 
gain is the primary purpose of their joint endeavor" (p. 33). 
Nor is it clear how The Theory's goal of optimizing family 
income fits with its argument that social dissensus bars divorce 
law from consulting any view about the goals of marriage. Per-
haps The Theory assumes that optimizing family income is so 
uncontroversial a goal that no one could object to it. In fact, 
however, I think that many people would feel that thus singling 
financially irrational sacrifices-those where the spouse assumes primary responsibility 
for child care. 
29. Professor Ellman also suggests that, in the absence of the kind of alimony he 
proposes, husbands whose wives made the kind of sacrifices which the theory will recom-
pense have an incentive to divorce, since the "party who has already received a benefit 
has an incentive to terminate the relationship before the balance of payments shifts" (p. 
43). Professor Ellman assumes that if the husband stays married, he must at least share 
his added earning power with his wife, while if he divorces her he can keep it all for 
himself. How true this is will vary from marriage to marriage and will depend, among 
other things, on the rules governing the division of marital property and child support. 
That the husband will often have an incentive to leave the marriage large and evident 
enough actually to affect his behavior seems to me uncertain. It seems less uncertain that 
a failure to reallocate the loss of the wife's earning power may give her an incentive to 
stay in the marriage. 
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out the optimization of family income sends an improper mes-
sage about the purpose of marriage. Such people could reasona-
bly argue that doing so is part of what they could regard as The 
Theory's larger error of conceptualizing marriage so largely in 
economic terms. But even if this goal were quite uncontroversial, 
there would remain a further problem: It may be impossible to 
create a system of incentives for optimizing family income that 
does not simultaneously create collateral incentives whose ef-
fects are less clearly desirable. To see how this might be so, let 
us examine two of The Theory's justifications for its incentive 
structure. 
First, The Theory suggests that its alimony regime "maxi-
mizes the parties' freedom to shape their marriage in accordance 
with their nonfinancial preferences" (p. 51). In fact, however, the 
theory has the (clearly unintended) effect of valuing marital in-
vestment at the expense of investments in careers and of putting 
what would seem to be "distorting pressures" on career deci-
sions. The theory's alimony regime would tend to induce the 
wife to abandon her career, since it allows her to do so without 
financial risk when she is confronted with the incentives of in-
creasing family income or staying home to take care of the chil-
dren and, possibly, accommodating her husband and pleasing 
herself. The theory's system thus seems to steer a spouse, usu-
ally the spouse with the lower earning potential, away , from a 
"complete" career. This result is especially problematic since in 
today's world that spouse is likely to be the woman. After all, 
the great changes in women's participation in the job market of 
the last two decades have been urged not just because they give 
women more earning power, although that of course is impor-
tant. They have also been urged on the grounds that a career 
can be intellectually, socially, and emotionally rewarding, can 
give women the sense and reality of autonomy, and can give 
women greater social power. To put the point a little differently, 
a theory of alimony that chose as its goal encouraging women to 
pursue demanding careers would not be self-evidently less justi-
fiable than one whose goal was maximizing family income. 
The problem here, of course, is not that Professor Ellman 
has wickedly preferred a bad goal to a good one. It is that he has 
chosen a good goal, and that the necessary but unintended con-
sequence of the means he has chosen for promoting it is to inter-
fere with reaching another good goal. Yet there may well be no 
good way of serving both good goals at once. There is an element 
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of perversity in the result I am describing. While the theory 
seems likely to have the effect of inducing women to abandon 
careers, it would seem harsh to try to encourage women to pur-
sue careers by denying wives compensation for the marital sacri-
fice of giving up careers. The difficulty here arises out of the 
clumsiness of the law's hortatory function: It may always be dif-
ficult to structure the law so that its incentives have the in-
tended effects; it may he impossible to do so in areas of life as 
complex as marital decisions. 
Professor Ellman not only justifies his theory in terms of its 
liberating effect on spouses' decisions, he also justifies it in terms 
of its promotion of marital sharing. He writes, "Unless society 
wants to discourage sharing behavior in marriage, its law cannot 
penalize the spouse who shares" (p. 51). But his system of ali-
mony encourages only one kind of sharing-giving up a career in 
order to maximize family income. And that kind of sharing is 
problematic in two ways. First, calling such a decision "sharing 
behavior" seems imprecise, since it can be thought of as self-
serving: it seems designed to maximize the welfare of the sharer, 
with possibly only the incidental effect of maximizing the wel-
fare of the family. Second, this is only one, and perhaps not the 
most desirable, kind of sharing. Another kind of sharing, for ex-
ample, would be that of a wife who gave up her own career op-
portunities so that her husband co:uld promote his, even if that 
meant some loss of family income.30 Yet the theory conspicu-
ously declines to promote such sharing on the grounds that it is 
economically irrational. 
This last point leads us to ask whether other kinds of trans-
actions fit the rationale for alhnony just as well as the transac-
tion the theory favors. As we have just seen, Professor Ellman 
suggests, "Unless society wants to discourage sharing behavior in 
marriage, its law cannot penalize the spouse who shares" (p. 51). 
Ought we not then refrain from penalizing any spouse who 
shares in any important way? Ought we not compensate spouses 
who have made any kind of financial sacrifice for each other? In 
particular, ought we not compensate spouses who have sacrificed 
earning capacity in economically "non-rational" ways? And 
ought we not compensate spouses who have made non-economic 
30. Let me once again repeat that, as I said in note 6, I am for the sake of clarity 
following Professor Ellman's practice of referring to the claimant for alimony as the wife. 
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sacrifices, at least where those sacrifices can reasonably be put in 
economic terms? 
One form of marital sharing which the theory entirely ex-
cludes from consideration is the income which th~ wife receives 
from the husband as a result of her investment. As I argued ear-
lier, the wife might well receive from her husband a full return 
on her investment during the marriage. But the theory "ignores 
the exchange that takes place during the marriage" (p. 55). Pro-
fessor Ellman writes that under modern divorce law, "[t]he rem-
edy, if either spouse believes the current exchange is unfair, is to 
end the, arrangement. [My] theory of alimony accepts that pro-
position, seeking only to make sure that on divorce neither 
spouse is left with residual effects that would distort marital 
decisionmaking" (p. 56). Divorce is surely one remedy for unfair 
exchanges, but is it, should it be, the only one? It seems an un-
satisfactory remedy here, because the spouses will not view the 
exchange as unfair during the marriage. That is, the parties will 
see the wife's sacrifice and the husband's contribution of income 
to his wife as reciprocal sacrifices, and even if the wife receives 
more than the husband, the husband is likely to believe that he, 
like the wife, is making a good investment in the marriage. The 
unfairness only arises when the marriage ends and the wife re-
ceives a second compensation in the form of alimony for her 
investment. 
Making divorce the only remedy for unfair marital ex-
changes seems additionally problematic in two ways. First, doing 
so may create an incentive for divorce: If a spouse knows that 
the law will if necessary provide some remedy for an unfair ex-
change during marriage, that spouse can afford to stay with the 
marriage in the hope of improving the exchange and the mar-
riage. If the spouse knows that the law will not provide such a 
remedy, the spouse has an incentive to leave the marriage as 
quickly as possible to escape the effects of the unfair exchange. 
Second, spouses who are on the short end of an unfair exchange 
during marriage may have excellent reasons for not abandoning 
the marriage. They may, for example, be doing their best to 
make the marriage work, or they may feel that staying in the 
marriage is best for the children. Why should such spouses be 
taken to have waived their only remedy for the unfair exchange? 
More basically, why should not an unfair exchange be con-
sidered when settling the financial affairs of the parties? Why 
should alimony be confined to "residual" losses? Why should a 
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continuing economic sacrifice by one spouse for the other during 
the marriage be less worthy of compensation than an economic 
sacrifice whose effects are felt only after divorce? For that mat-
ter, how realistic is it to say that "lost earning capacity is the 
only continuing financial loss" (p. 53). vVhile that may be true in 
some senses, it seems false in others. Suppose that a wife con-
tributes disproportionately to the family income and that the 
husband consumes the family income disproportionately. The 
wife might have emerged from the marriage with "more" if she 
hadn't been involved in the unbalanced exchange during the 
marriage; she might suffer the continuing economic loss of own-
ing less of the things that made life more comfortable for her. 
One might even say that, had the exchange been better bal-
anced, she might have had more earning power, in the sense that 
she might have had larger income-generating assets. 
Of course, this kind of disproportion could be rectified (as-
suming that rectification is desirable) through that other remedy 
the law provides for marital misallocations, namely, the law reg-
ulating the division of property on divorce. Reasonably enough, 
Professor Ellman has not yet developed a theory to govern prop-
erty division nor worked out how property division and alimony 
interact. He is of course aware of the need for a theory of mari-
tal property and hints that one is in the works (p. 53, n.147). We 
may hope that he will soon turn to creating one, if only because 
property division and alimony cannot be adequately treated sep-
arately and perhaps should be analyzed under the same princi-
ples, since both answer a single question: how should the eco-
nomic assets (broadly understood) of the spouses be allocated on 
divorce? 
Given the theory's imperative of encouraging "sharing be-
havior in marriage," it is also hard to see why alimony is not 
available in a particularly common and consequential kind of 
marital sharing-the kind where a "financially irrational" sacri-
fice was made. In this category fall cases in which one spouse 
accommodates the other's "lifestyle preferences," as where a 
wife, at her husband's behest, makes a financially irrational deci-
sion to be a housewife. Here we have a potentially severe loss of 
earning capacity that will (as the theory insists a loss must in 
order to be a basis for alimony) continue after divorce. But de-
spite the size of the loss, under the theory, it is not compensable 
because the sacrifice was not economically rational. (Indeed, the 
worse the loss of earning capacity, the less compensable it is be-
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cause the less economically rational it is.) Professor Ellman ex-
plains that "when one spouse foregoes a market opportunity to 
accommodate a lifestyle preference, both spouses know that 
lower income will result. On divorce, the spouse who made the 
financial sacrifice suffers no additional financial burden as a re-
sult, beyond that already incurred during the marriage" (p. 61). 
But why should this make any difference? The housewife seems 
to be in the same position as the IBM supplier and indeed as the 
spouse who sacrificed her earning power in order to maximize 
the family's income. All made a decision with lasting financial 
consequences. All will suffer the consequences of that decision 
alone if the relationship ends. All will more readily make the 
decision if contractual protection is available. It is available for 
the supplier; the theory would provide an alimonial substitute 
for contractual protection for the spouse whose sacrifice in-
creases family income. Why is the same substitute unavailable to 
the spouse whose sacrifice does not increase family income? 
Why is her decision not "marital sharing behavior" which we 
want to protect on divorce?31 
A possible difference between the cases of the two sacrific-
ing wives is that where the wife's sacrifice maximized family in-
come, the husband's earning power will often have been in-
creased by the sacrifice, while where the wife's sacrifice did not 
maximize family income, the husband's earning power will often 
not have been increased. Should this difference matter? On the 
theory's principles, it is hard to see why. As I argued in the pre-
ceding paragraph, alimony seems necessary if the housewife who 
makes the non-rational sacrifice is not to face a "distorting" in-
centive. Further, the husbands' situations in the two cases we 
31. Is the answer that we only want to encourage marital sharing of a financial 
kind? As I have been suggesting (and as The Theory itself seems to say), it is hard to see 
why we should not want to encourage all kinds of marital sharing. But even if we want to 
(or, as The Theory suggests, as a practical matter must) limit ourselves to encouraging 
only financial sharing, isn't an "economically irrational" sacrifice financial sharing, since 
it represents a gift of the wife to the husband of some of her earning power? 
Professor Ellman suggests that "we have no basis at all for a social policy that en-
courages one spouse to agree to reduce marital income to accommodate the other's nonfi-
nancial values" (p. 62). Professor Ellman helps justify encouraging financially rational 
sacrifices on the theory that the market rewards socially desirable behavior, and it is true 
that that policy cannot justify encouraging financially irrational sacrifices. But, first, that 
policy seems to me particularly weak applied to marital decisions, since marriage is 
surely one of the areas of life least well evaluated in market terms. And, second, why is 
not the policy in favor of marital sharing itself an adequate basis for encouraging even 
financially irrational sacrifices? 
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have been discussing do not necessarily differ. The husband of 
the wife who sacrificed to increase the family's income will not 
always have gained an increase in earning power from her sacri-
fice. For example, if the wife left a poorly paying part-time job 
in order to do housework which the couple would otherwise have 
had to pay someone to do, the sacrifice may be financially ra-
tional without increasing the husband's income. And a finan-
cially irrational' sacrifice might increase the husband's income 
(because, for instance, of the wife's help with his business enter-
taining) since the wife might be able to earn more working 
outside their home than helping her husband in it. 
Some insight into The Theory's refusal to recompense fi-
nancially irrational sacrifices may be found in its explanation of 
why the wife receives no alimony where the investment yields no 
gain, The Theory reasons, "If she invests in herself and does 
poorly, she has no one else to cover her loss. There is no reason 
why someone else should cover it if she invests in her husband 
instead and he does poorly" (p. 67). But this argument seems 
dangerous to tP,e theory, since it suggests the question why 
someone else should cover the wife's loss if she invests in her 
marriage and it does poorly. Professor Ellman further explains, 
"We certainly do not want the wife, or the husband, to have 
their judgment influenced by an alimony system which makes an 
investment in one's spouse riskless, but not an investment in 
oneself'' (p. 67). However, isn't that close to being the practical 
effect of the theory's rule? The only risk the sacrificing wife runs 
is the risk that the investment in her husband won't pay off at 
all. But as long as there is some gain f'rom the sacrifice, then the 
wife is guaranteed the full value of her lost earning capacity. She 
is thus relieved of the many risks that her investment in herself 
might otherwise have run. 
I have been finding problems in the fact that the theory 
gives relief on divorce only for one kind of investment. I now 
want to raise the question whether that relief can be properly 
calculated outside of the larger context of the marriage. We have 
already encountered one problem with calculating relief on the 
narrow base the theory requires: I have argued that the wife will 
sometimes be overcompensated because the theory does not take 
into account the return she receives on her investment during 
the marriage and that she will sometimes be under-compensated 
because the theory does not give her expectation damages. 
But the problem is larger than the failure to consider the 
197] RETHINKING ALIMONY 225 
wife's immediate return on her investment in calculating ali-
mony. None of the husband's "marital sharing behavior" can be 
taken into account to reduce what he owes his wife. Spouses en-
gage in marital sharing partly because they expect and get recip-
rocal sharing. Sometimes this reciprocal sharing is given in di-
rect response to the other spouse's sacrifice. But it does not 
necessarily . obey the Aristotelian unities of action, time, and 
place. There may not be an immediately evident logical connec-
tion between one transaction and another. The two transactions 
may be widely separated in time. One transaction may be an ec-
onomic one, while its reciprocal may be non-economic. Some-
times one transaction is expressly exacted as the price of the 
other, sometimes not. But, in a good marriage and sometimes 
even in a bad one, these transactions may roughly balance out. 
By singling out one kind of transaction from this stream of 
transactions, we may exaggerate the need for legally provided 
incentives of the kind the theory contemplates. We may also 
compel compensation where compensation has already been paid 
in terms satisfactory to the spouses while they were married, 
and that she will sometimes be undercompensated because the 
theory does not give her expectation damages. 
One of the theory's justifications for singling out a single 
marital transaction among many seems to be that calculating the 
net effects of all the possibly relevant transactions would be too 
difficult: "Trying to assess all the nuances of the spouses' bar-
gain to determine whether each has received full value during 
the marriage is impossible" (p. 51). And later, "[T]he law cannot 
evaluate every aspect of marital behavior in fixing the divorcing 
parties' financial obligations. If we do not impose a limit, we 
would have to consider every sacrifice one makes for one's mate, 
and this would extend to nonfinancial losses as well" (p. 61). 
Part of the argument here is that "[a]djudication of such claims 
would require examining the reasons for the divorce-who is at 
fault, who 'breached'" (p. 53), an examination the theory takes 
to be essentially impossible and outside the law's purview in an 
era of no-fault divorce. 
The question of the law's purview I wish to postpone until 
Part IV. The arguments about the difficulty of making the re-
quired calculations seem to me genuinely weighty. But they raise 
two questions. First, the calculations the theory itself requires 
are, as I am about to argue, themselves greatly complex, specula-
tive, and inexact. It is not clear why the theory accept<> those 
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drawbacks in one context but rejects them in others. Second, 
while it may be impossible to reach a fair result when so many 
complicated and obscure facts must be considered, is it not also 
impossible to reach a fair result without considering them? 
However difficult it is to weigh all the transactions between 
spouses, isn't it equally difficult to single out one sacrifice from 
all the rest when in the minds of the couple that sacrifice was 
part of a larger context? Will it not at least sometimes be unfair 
to do so? 
In its discussion of marital contracting, The Theory recog-
nizes the problem with singling out one kind of transaction from 
all the rest. Professor Ellman writes, "In many marriage dis-
putes it would surely distort the parties' real expectations, and 
upset their reasonable reliance based upon those expectations, to 
single out one discrete, specific agreement for enforcement with-
out examining the larger relationship in which it arose" (pp. 30-
31). And he observes that "neither party is likely to consider 
... more specific commitments as having a meaning indepen-
dent of the more complete relationship contemplated by the 
marriage" (p. 20, n.45).32 This seems to me quite right. But when 
Professor Ellman comes to his theory of alimony, he discounts 
this kind of argument and says that his "theory assumes that we 
can sensibly isolate decisions that a couple rationally expects 
will enhance their aggregate income, and ensure that in making 
such a decision neither takes a risk of disproportionate loss if 
divorce then occurs" (p. 62). Yet it is not clear why the theory 
makes that assumption or that it is correct. Nor is it clear that a 
theory that rests on the need to· adjust the law to affect marital 
decisions properly can safely ignore so much of the incentive 
structure of marriage. 
In this section, I have asked why the kind of marital sharing 
the theory seeks to promote ought to be promoted at the ex-
pense of other marital goals. I have also asked why some kinds 
of marital sharing are protected but other kinds are not. And I 
have questioned whether one marital transaction can properly 
be isolated from the rest. All these points present problems for 
32. Indeed, at one point Professor Ellman recruits the "singling out" argument to 
reject a criticism of his alimony theory which I advanced a version of above, namely, that 
"the wealthy man's wife has already been compensated for her marital investment." Pro-
fessor Ellman responds that this argument "assumes an unrealistically accurate measure 
of the total give-and-take of marriage, of which the wife's investment is just one part" (p. 
55). So it does. But Professor Ellman's theory seems just as open to this response. 
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the theory as an exercise of the law's hortatory function, since 
they raise questions about kinds of behavior the law can and 
should properly encourage. These points also present problems 
for the theory as an exercise of the law's dispute-settlement 
function, since they raise questions about the theory's fairness. 
Those questions I will postpone until Part IV, because first we 
need to ask whether, even on the theory's own terms, alimony 
can be calculated with enough precision to make the theory 
workable. 
D. Calculating Alimony Under the Theory 
The Theory of Alimony is a long article on a hard topic. 
Quite reasonably, therefore, it does not show with any specificity 
how alimony would be calculated under its principles. Since 
such a demonstration is a crucial next step, I will try to sketch 
some of the problems it may encounter. Those problems seem to 
me numerous and serious. 
To receive alimony, the wife must show that her "sacrifice" 
or "investment" was "financially rational." First, how is she to 
show that there was a "sacrifice" or an "investment"? The The-
ory says that the couple need not have intended an investment 
for the wife to receive alimony. This may create some uncertain-
ties about whether there has been an "investment." Sometimes, 
of course, the investment will be amply clear: the parties will 
have made a deliberate decision in which both of them realized 
that the wife was giving up a career opportunity so that her hus-
band could increase his income. But what if no such decision 
occurs? The Theory calls for alimony even when the "invest-
ment" is not a "sacrifice" (that is, when the wife wanted to give 
up the career opportunity because of her own preferences about 
spending her time and not in order to enhance marital income). 
But what if the "investment" is not an investment at all? What 
if it was not made with the intention of allowing or helping the 
husband to increase his earning power? What if the husband can 
show that he would have been able to increase his earning power 
whether or not his wife had made the "investment"? 
As these questions suggest, it will often be difficult to tell 
whether a "compensable event" has occurred. Is it enough that 
the wife gives up a career at the time the husband takes a higher 
paying job? Does she also have to show that her decision was 
necessary to make his possible? Suppose the two decisions are· 
significantly separated in time? Suppose that rather than quit-
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ting a high paying job, the wife refused a promotion? Suppose 
that she simply didn't seek a promotion? Suppose that she sim-
ply never sought a high paying job? That she never sought em-
ployment? That she never sought training for employment? 
Suppose that the couple were married while the wife was still in 
school and that the question of the wife's working simply never 
arose? 
In this last case, it would seem that the theory would not 
call for alimony, since the couple never made a decision which 
needed to be protected from distorting influences and since the 
wife never changed her position. Yet upon divorce the wife in 
that case might be economically and socially in exactly the same 
position as a wife who had made a decision during her marriage 
to abandon a career in order to maximize her family's income. 
Why should the happenstance of the timing and explicitness of 
her decision matter, and matter so dispositively? 
The second question the requirements for alimony raise is 
what "financially rational" means. If the husband is offered a 
job that would immediately pay less but eventually pay more, is 
it financially rational for him to take it? What if it would imme-
diately pay more but would eventually pay less? What if he is 
offered a job that offers the possibility of high gains but also the 
substantial risk of high losses? What if he thinks the new job 
will be financially more rewarding than his old job, but that con-
clusion is objectively incorrect? 
In order to qualify for alimony, the wife must show not just 
that her investment was :financially rational, but that it in fact 
resulted in a "gain." How is that gain to be measured? The gain 
is presumably the gain acquired by the wife's having sacrificed 
her career to benefit her husband's. To discover whether that 
sacrifice was economically worthwhile, one presumably has to 
figure out how much each of them did in fact earn and compare 
it with how much each of them would have earned had the wife 
not made the sacrifice. Over what period are these earnings to be 
calculated? Over the period foreseeable when the sacrifice was 
made? Over the life of the marriage? What if the divorce takes 
place fairly soon after the sacrifice and no gain has yet devel-
oped, but the sacrifice was a serious and permanent one? Can 
the wife argue that a gain would have developed had the mar-
riage lasted? And even if we are confident that there has been a 
gain in family income, how are we to know whether that gain is 
attributable to the wife's sacrifice? 
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The wife's measure of damages is her "loss in earning capac-
ity" (p. 73). This apparently means that the measure is the dif-
ference between her earning capacity as it actually is and her 
earning capacity as it would have been had she not made the 
sacrifice. But "is" and "would have been" at what point? Since 
we are talking about a loss that survives the marriage, "is" pre-
sumably means for the rest of her working life, and "would have 
been" presumably means for the rest of her working life had she 
not made the sacrifice. How, then, are we to determine the wife's 
earning capacity as it is and as it might have been over those 
long reaches into the future? The easier inquiry is surely into 
the wife's earning capacity as it is. But even this inquiry has its 
perplexities. For example, is it enough to ask what the wife is 
presently earning and to call that her earning capacity? Suppose 
she could be making large sums practicing law but is in fact (for 
reasons unconnected with an economically rational investment 
in the marriage) making small sums teaching it? Or suppose that 
the reason for the wife's sacrifice of earning capacity has passed 
(or eventually will pass) and that she could work her way back 
to the earning capacity she had sacrificed. If she failed to do so, 
would she be treated as having that higher earning capacity? 
The Theory seems to suggest that she should be, for, in discuss-· 
ing the analogous claims to alimony of wives who cared for chil-
dren, it says that "the woman who remains a homemaker even 
after her children are grown ceases to benefit from Principle 
Three. She can recover only half the earning capacity she would 
have lost assuming she had gone ba~k to work when the children 
were grown, whether or not she actually did"33 (p. 73). This cal-
culation may be relatively easy to make where the issue is taking 
care of children, since there will be a particular children's age at 
which we might reasonably ask whether the mother could go 
back to work. In other cases, however, it will be harder to iden-
tify the time when she could, or should, have returned to a 
higher-paying job. 
These difficulties, however, are as nothing compared with 
the difficulties of calculating what her earning capacity would 
have been but for the sacrifice. Suppose, for instance, that the 
wife sacrificed one career and took a less lucrative one that al-
33. Principle Three states that "The Homemaker Spouse May Claim Half the Value 
of Her Lost Earning Capacity, Even Though It Exceeds the Market Value of Her Do-
mestic Services, When These Services Included Primary Responsibility for the Care of 
Children" (p. 71). 
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lowed her to keep house and to help her husband with his ca-
reer. In calculating alimony, do we have to ask whether she actu-
ally had the ability to achieve the higher earning power that 
might have come from the sacrificed career? Whether she would 
have been willing to pursue the better-paying career as it be-
came more onerous? Suppose that the sacrificed career had 
many branches, some more lucrative than others. Are we to as-
sume that she would have taken the most lucrative route? If she 
gave up a career as a teacher, would we have to gauge the possi-
bility that she would have gone into administration and thus 
earned more?34 
How well could we even determine what career she gave up? 
If a wife sacrificed going to college to support her husband 
through college and medical school, should we simply compen-
sate her for her forsaken college degree? Or should we speculate 
about whether she would herself have gone to medical school af-
ter college? And done post-graduate work in microbiology? And 
gone to work for Warner-Lambert? And become a senior re-
search scientist? And won a Nobel Prize? 
One might try to answer such questions by looking at the 
sacrificing spouse's ambitions and abilities. However, that 
method seems likely to founder on the unrealiability of people's 
ambitions as predictors of their actual behavior and of estimates 
of people's abilities as predictors of their worldly success. Fur-
ther, using ambition in this way might systematically advantage 
men over women in calculating alimony. At present, at least, 
men more than women are socialized to have large ambitions for 
their careers. If ambition is used in calculating alimony awards, 
sacrificing husbands will on average be better compensated than 
sacrificing wives. 
All this raises an important question about the social func-
tion of alimony. Alimony has long worked to help protect women 
from some of the economic (and social) consequences of their 
weak position in the marketplace. While Professor Ellman's the-
ory of alimony protects women who have a career to sacrifice 
from the consequences of one kind of sacrifice, it does nothing to 
protect women in other circumstances. Perhaps alimony ought 
not do so. As Professor Leyy observes, there is an argument to 
34. This is Professor Ellman'~. own example. The Theory acknowledges the general 
difficulty of calculating alimony under the theory and provides some instances of that 
difficulty (p. 78). But the acknowledgment seems to me too sanguine and the examples 
seem to me too few to convey fully the scope of the difficulty. 
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be made that individual divorced men should not bear the bur-
den of ameliorating a problem that is more properly society's.35 
But I do not think this function of alimony should be jettisoned 
without a more prolonged and considered inquiry. 
In calculating the wife's hypothetical earning capacity, we 
will not only need to look at the wife's career. We will also need 
to look at the social circumstances that would have affected her 
career. For instance, we might want to ask whether there would 
have come a time when it would have been economically irra-
tional for her to further pursue the forsaken career, given a con-
flict with her husband's career. Should we have to ask whether 
she would have abandoned the career at that point? Ought we 
say, for purposes of calculating alimony, that she should have 
abandoned it at that point even if we don't think she would 
have? 
Do we need to ask not just what career the wife would have 
pursued had she not made the sacrifice, but also what it would 
have cost her to do so? Should the saved expenses of starting 
and maintaining a career be subtracted from the earning capac-
ity she would have had but for the sacrifice? If she gave up col-
lege in order to support her husband through his medical school, 
do we subtract from the differences in earning capacity the ex-
penses of college? Some of these expenses will of course be fi-
nancial. But do we also subtract the value of the labor which a 
wife would have had to expend in a sacrificed career but which 
was not expended given the sacrifice? If the wife gave up a ca-
reer in a law firm in favor of keeping house, and if she would 
have had to work harder as a lawyer than she did keeping house, 
do we subtract the value of the work she did not do from the 
amount of her recovery, since some of the difference in earning 
power is attributable to the extra work she would have done, not 
to the sacrifice?36 
It is worth noting that, when courts began to decide 
whether professional degrees are "property" divisible on divorce, 
they realized that valuing that kind of property would require 
courts to ask questions very much like the ones I have been ask-
ing. The impossibility of answering such questions with confi-
35. Robert J. Levy, Reminiscence About the Uniform Marriage and Divorce 
Act-and Some Reflections Abouts Its Critics and Its Policies, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 43. 
36. There may also be an argument for subtracting from the award of alimony any 
expenses to which the husband was put in pursuing the more lucrative career made pos-
sible by his wife's sacrifice. 
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dence helped deter courts from treating degrees as property (al-
though courts have sought other means of compensating people 
who supported spouses through professional school). 
The Theory's way out of many of these quandaries is to 
"combine statistical data suggesting average outcomes in like 
cases with evidence particular to the claimant" (p. 79). But this 
solution seems partial and problematic. Many of these questions 
cannot be solved simply by looking to average outcomes for 
cases, because those cases have not yet occurred. We are, after 
all, projecting the wife's hypothetical "non-sacrifice" earning 
power into the future, possibly for as long as thirty or forty 
years or even more. And as we saw, it will sometimes be hard 
even to know what career she would have been pursuing. Thus 
there will often be quite baffling questions about what a "like 
case" would be. And there will often be no adequate evidence 
about any truly "like" case, as The Theory acknowledges (p. 79, 
n.187). 
Not only does using statistical data seem technically prob-
lematic, but there will also be major questions of fairness in rely-
ing on averages. In roughly ha:lf the cases the wife will get too 
much, in roughly half too little. Even though she presumably 
gets something close to the correct amount in the middle range 
of cases, the scope for error seems great. Professor Ellman 
rightly says that "rules of law often call for speculative measure-
ments ... " (p. 78). But, as he acknowledges, "they may also 
reject them when they are too 'speculative" (p .. 78). It is hard to 
think of many rules of law that call for as many measurements 
that are as brutally speculative as those the theory calls for. And 
it is hard to justify expanding that unattractive category.37 
In sum, there is a danger that the wife will be recompensed 
in a large amount (where the sacrifice ·was dramatic and where 
the difference in earning power matters for a prolonged period) 
even though she has already drawn more than the benefit of the 
sacrifice during the marriage (where she worked relatively little 
during the marriage but drew on the extra income her husband 
made because of her sacrifice) and even though she might not in 
fact have come close to earning the amount her "earning power" 
would theoretically have entitled her to, all on a calculation 
37. As my colleague Kent Syverud commented to me, wrongful death cases involv-
ing minors can call for remarkably problematic calculations of lost earnings. But as he 
also noted, "it is distasteful speculation there as well." 
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based on highly uncertain suppositions about what might have 
happened and on far from certain calculations about what did 
happen. There is also a danger that the wife will not be recom-
pensed at all despite a great disparity in her earning power and 
her husband's, despite her great need, and despite her great sac-
rifice, because she cannot demonstrate that she would have suc-
ceeded in the career she sacrificed or because the sacrifice was 
not economically rational. 
One way of summing up the points I have made in Part III 
is to say that the theory seems problematic even when it is con-
sidered just as an economic model. The model's shortcomings 
are suggested by the fact that it must be narrowed in so many 
ways. First, all transactions except financial transactions are ex-
cluded from the model. Second, all financial transactions except 
those between one or both of the spouses on one hand and out-
siders on the other are excluded. Even financial transactions 
with outsiders seem to be limited to wage-earning and en-
trepreneurial activities. Within this small world, the theory ap-
plies a test of maximizing joint financial wealth. Yet economists 
regularly deal, for example, with trade-offs between wealth and 
leisure, with psychic income in numerous forms, and so on. 
Even narrowed as it is, the model is probably unmanageable 
in practice. As I have tried to show, it seems unlikely that the 
theory would be noticed and heeded widely and accurately 
enough to serve the hortatory function which is its justification. 
And it seems likely that the theory would involve courts (and 
divorcing spouses and their lawyers) in impossibly speculative 
calculations. · 
IV. THE THEORY AND MoRAL DiscouRsE 
A. Stating the Issues 
I am interested in The Theory of Alimony not just for its 
answers to the riddle of alimony, but also because of what it 
reveals about the diminution in moral discourse that I believe 
has recently characterized family law. By a diminution in moral 
discourse, I mean that courts and other lawmakers are less likely 
to discus~ legal problems in moral language (and are more likely 
to try to transfer moral decisions to the parties the law is regu-
lating). This does not, of course, mean that lawmakers' decisions 
are necessarily less moral, that family law is necessarily deprived 
of a moral basis, or that lawmakers may not have moral reasons 
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for avoiding moral discourse. It simply means that the terms 
lawmakers use in explaining (and presumably in thinking about) 
their work are decreasingly drawn from the vocabulary of morals 
and are increasingly drawn from the discourse of economics, 
psychology, public policy studies, medicine, or from those as-
pects of legal doctrine which speak in other _than moral terms. 38 
In my earlier article, I· tried only to describe, and not to 
evaluate, the trend toward diminished moral discourse. An arti-
cle on alimony is hardly the place for a full-dress evaluation of 
the language of family law, but The Theory provides a useful 
test case of the trend. And I hope that in the course of evaluat-
ing the trend, we can also deepen our understanding of the the-
ory of alimony, for I will conclude that many of the theory's 
drawbacks arise from its attempt to justify alimony in morally 
neutral terms and to keep courts from asking what the moral 
relations of the spouses are. 
As should by now be clear, questions about the moral justi-
fication for alimony and the need for and worth of inquiries into 
the moral relations of the divorcing spouses are central to The 
Theory of Alimony. Professor Ellman's starting point in devising 
a theory is the belief that the triumph of no-fault divorce stands 
for the principle that courts ought not investigate the moral re-
lations between the spouses when making any of the decisions 
associated with divorce. Professor Ellman also reasons that the 
disintegration of a social "consensus" about the normative con-
tent of marriage confirms the need for that principle. He rejects 
analogies to contract and partnership as bases for alimony in 
large part because both would require courts to undertake just 
such investigations. As he reasonably argues, both contract and 
partnership law smuggle fault (broadly understood)39 back into 
divorce law by requiring courts to ask what the initial agreement 
between the parties was and what constitutes a breach of it. In 
sum, the law of alimony which Professor Ellman describes is a 
38. I describe the trend at length in Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the 
Transformation of American Family Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803 (1985). There I say, "A 
decision made on moral grounds turns on whether particular conduct is 'right' or 'wrong,' 
whether it accords with the oblig&~ions owed other people or oneself." Id. at 1827. 
39. Technically, marital fault refers only to behavior which constitutes grounds for 
divorce in a fault-based system. But Professor Ellman uses the term more broadly, to 
refer to any kind of misbehavior which might be taken into account in making decisions 
about awarding alimony and dividing marital property. For the sake of convenience, I 
will follow his practice. 
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law in which moral discourse has become increasingly 
inappropriate. 
Professor Ellman's own theory of alimony, while "consistent 
with equitable notions," is not principally based on equitable 
ideas, but rather rests "on the proposition that marital invest-
ment decisions should be free from potentially distorting penal-
ties and incentives" (p. 51). Whether or not Professor Ellman set 
out to do so, he has developed a theory one of whose attractions 
will be that it may be essentially justified in other than moral 
terms. It is a theory which, in other words, basically takes a nor-
mally functioning market as its guide and asks how such a mar-
ket can be achieved within marriages so that husbands and 
wives can make decisions free of "distorting" influences.40 It is, 
in addition, a theory which strives to allow courts to resolve ali-
mony disputes without evaluating the spouses' moral relations 
and which is repeatedly contrasted with alternative theories 
which would require such evaluations. Because the theory is 
carefully justified in non-moral terms and because it sedulously 
seeks to allow courts to avoid moral inquiries, I see the theory as 
embodying the trend toward diminished moral discourse. 41 
Despite the insight and ingenuity which The Theory de-
votes to constructing a theory of alimony which does not rely on 
moral discourse for its justification or application, its success is 
limited by several obstacles. The nature and number of these 
obstacles suggest to me that removing moral discourse from the 
law of alimony has serious drawbacks. More specifically, a mor-
ally neutral justification for alimony probably cannot be con-
structed, and legislatures and courts cannot easily exclude the 
moral relations of the parties from their decisions about 
alimony. 
B. Can There Be a Morally Neutral Justification for 
Alimony? 
We will look first at The Theory's attempt to find a morally 
40. I am not, of course, suggesting that Professor Ellman's approach is without a 
possible moral foundation, much less that it is immoral. I am suggesting that it avoids 
describing that foundation and that it tries to take divorce courts out of the business of 
evaluating the moral relations of the parties. 
41. I see it as embodying that trend in its most admirable form. The theory is 
driven away from moral discourse by the most serious kinds of problems with such dis-
course in family law, and the theory is free of the shallow psychological ideas which have 
hastened the abandonment of moral discourse. 
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neutral justification for alimony. I will wind up arguing that that 
attempt does not succeed. But in order to make my position 
clear, it will be necessary to digress slightly to distinguish that 
position from a more general view about the impossibility of 
moral neutrality in family law. 
We begin, then, with the banal but relevant observation 
that (in some but not all important senses) the law cannot es-
cape affecting the way people behave in life generally and in 
marriages particularly. Whatever alimony rules we write (even if 
we write none) will affect the incentive structure of marital deci-
sions and thus will (potentially) affect the moral relations of the 
parties. Therefore any position the law of alimony takes must 
have moral consequences, even if none are explicitly intended. 
But this crude statement of the problem needs to be re-
fined. There is indeed a sense in which the law cannot be truly 
neutral toward any important aspect of human life. If people 
aren't influenced by the law, they will be influenced by some-
thing else. That is, even when the law doesn't regulate people in 
some respect, they will still face socially created incentive struc-
tures. These structures include the market, the network of psy-
chological relationships in which people find themselves, the so-
cial institutions to which people belong, and the systems of 
values-religious, philosophical, and cultural-to which people 
adhere. By deciding not to impose its own incentive structures, 
the law is in some sense deciding to leave people to be influ-
enced by those alternative incentive structures alone.42 Not to 
decide is to decide, as the cliche goes. In any important area of 
life, these alternative incentive structures will have different 
moral consequences, consequences the government could have 
tried to affect if it had chosen to. Thus the law cannot be mor-
ally neutral. 
This line of reasoning has led some commentators to con-
clude that it is inapt or even meaningless to talk about govern-
ment neutrality or to distinguish between government interven-
tion and non-intervention in the family.43 However, that 
conclusion is misleadingly strong, and it obscures a good deal of 
42. And of course these institutions themselves cannot easily escape being influ-
enced by the state, so that even when the government does not directly regulate individ-
uals, it may affect them through its influence on those institutions. 
43. See Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wise. L. Rev. 
1135; Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. Mich. J. L. 
Ref. 835 (1985). 
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complexity. It seems to me that there are often senses in which 
it is useful to talk about government neutrality and distinguish 
between intervention and non-intervention. Some of the ob-
scured complexity can be gotten at by asking why we care 
whether the government is neutral or whether it is intervening 
in the family. One reason we care is because of the effect govern-
mental action can have on people's lives and because of our pref-
erence for individual autonomy. But the fact that the law cannot 
be morally neutral in the sense I described in the preceding par-
agraph does not mean that the law's decisions (whether to act or 
not to act) always significantly affect people's lives. For instance, 
governmental abstention will often leave family members with 
the sense and even the reality of greater control over their lives 
than direct governmental regulation of families. When the gov-
ernment does not act, and sometimes even when it does, the in-
centive structures which remain may be weak, and they may 
conflict, so that people have some important degree of choice 
about how to behave. This, I think, helps account for the almost 
universal sense that there is a meaningful difference between 
'government intervention and non-intervention. 
In addition, it is too simple to see people as simply respond-
ing to the incentive structures of the government or of the social 
institutions which are left free to act when the government 
doesn't. It is too simple because many people will not see them-
selves as subject to those social institutions, but rather will feel 
that those institutions are part of their own social and moral 
personalities. For that matter, many people will not see the gov-
ernment as an entity entirely separate from themselves, but 
rather will see the government acting as their own agents. 
In addition, if we are evaluating the government's neutrality 
it will often matter why the government has not acted. It is one 
thing for the government to try to regulate an area of life with 
the intention of promoting a moral view. It is another thing for 
the government to decline to regulate that area of life for rea-
sons other than a desire to promote a moral view by not acting 
and thereby allowing other social institutions to operate un-
hindered by the government. There are a number of reasons the 
government might choose not to act. It might simply conclude 
that it lacked the economic resources to act, that it could not 
make decisions as efficiently as another social institution, that it 
could not enforce its decisions effectively, that it could not iden-
tify a goal it wished to reach, or that it lacked the legal authority 
238 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1991 
to act. Often, the government may wish to promote some social 
value or purpose but will be inhibited from acting because it 
cannot act without impairing some other social value or purpose. 
This is virtually a generic problem in family law. The govern-
ment wants to protect family members from all kinds of harms. 
However, it also wants to promote both the autonomy of fami-
lies and family members. It will often be impossible for the gov-
ernment simultaneously to promote the autonomy of families 
and of their members and impossible to promote either kind of 
autonomy while protecting family members from harm. 
When the government fails to act for reasons of this kind, 
its decision may have moral consequences, but it will often be 
imprecise to say that the government intended them. Sometimes 
the government will have been truly indifferent-that is, it will 
have concluded that all the likely outcomes were equally desira-
ble or undesirable. Sometimes it will have preferred one out-
come but found itself barred (for the kinds of reasons I sketched 
above) from acting to effectuate that outcome. Sometimes it will 
simply not have realized that there was an issue to resolve. 
The idea of governmental neutrality has another compo-
nent. It is sometimes thought that it is better for the govern-
ment not to try to affect the "socially created incentive struc-
tures" of which I spoke earlier. The reason given for this view 
may be that those structures operate more efficiently and make 
better decisions than the government could. This is of course the 
classic rationale for laissez-faire in economic policy, and it too ~s 
part of the rationale for the doctrine of "family autonomy." The 
reason may also be that those structures serve important social 
purposes and that they would be weakened if the government 
actively regulated them.44 This is of course a classic rationale for 
the separation of church and state, and it too is part of the ra-
tionale for the doctrine of family autonomy. Or the reason may 
be that it is thought that government "neutrality" gives those 
structures leeway to operate and allows people more autonomy 
than governmental supervention would. Here again we encoun-
ter another rationale for the doctrine of family autonomy. The 
fact that the government in some sense allows these institutions 
to function and even that it in some ways promotes them does 
44. For such an argument, see Peter L. Berger and Richard Neuhaus, To Empower 
People (1977), and Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 
865 (1989). 
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not mean that they are simply the government's agents or that 
they are not in basic ways independent of the government. 
For all these reasons, it will often mean little to say that the 
government cannot be morally neutral. Sometimes the govern-
ment will not in any useful sense be pursuing any moral goal, 
will not be seen to be doing so, and will be having little effect. 
On the other hand, The Theory's alimony regime is not intended 
to be such a circumstance. That regime has what we have been 
calling a hortatory purpose-it seeks to affect people's behavior, 
and seeks to do so in the service of a set of moral goals. It seeks, 
that is, to promote a particular kind of marital sharing and a 
"traditional ideal" {p. 72) of child-care. It is true that The The-
ory is framed in the apparently neutral terms of the market. 
However, as Professor Ellman would no doubt acknowledge, 
market principles rest on their own moral ideas and have their 
own moral consequences. 
But even if the particular theory we are analyzing were not 
"hortatory," it would still have trouble finding a morally neutral 
basis. Alimony itself is a legal doctrine. The spouses' very dis-
pute over alimony exists because the law makes alimony possi-
ble. Not only has the law created alimony, having created it, it 
must set rules for it. As we have seen, if alimony has a hortatory 
purpose, the law must decide which goals to promote. If, on the 
other hand, its purpose is to resolve disputes, it still must decide 
which rules will resolve disputes most fairly. For all these rea-
sons, the government cannot achieve any genuine neutrality. 
More specifically, there are two kinds of reasons it will be 
hard to write morally neutral rules for alimony. The first is that 
there are many goals we may reasonably want marriages to at-
tain and that these goals as a practical matter often conflict. To 
put the conflict in the most general terms, we may want to pro-
mote a conception of the couple as an indivisible entity and yet 
also to promote the personal autonomy of both spouses. It is 
probably impossible to write rules that will reliably accomplish 
both these goals for most of the people to whom the rules will 
apply. 
The second problem returns us to Professor Atiyah's dis-
tinction between the hortatory and dispute-settlement functions 
of the law. As we have seen, the law of alimony has to operate in 
two different contexts: first, it establishes rules that affect the 
decisions of couples while they are married; second, it estab-
lishes rules to govern the marriage's dissolution. But, as Profes-
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sor Atiyah observes, "the desire to settle a present dispute by 
imposing a decision which does justice in all the circumstances 
of the case is often likely to conflict with the desire to encourage 
or discourage particular types of behaviour in the future."45 This 
conflict infects the law. of alimony in a way that reiterates the 
conflict I discussed in the preceding paragraph. In its hortatory 
function, the law is centrally concerned with encouraging the 
spouses to be concerned for each other; in its dispute-settlement 
function, the law is primarily interested in resolving a dispute 
between the two individuals and in disentangling their affairs so 
that they need not deal with each other. 
Spouses will always find themselves torn between the values 
of the marketplace and the values of the family, between their 
ambitions for themselves and their hopes for each other. The 
law of alimony may make some of those choices easier, but at 
the expense of making others harder. As I argued above, The 
Theory's attempt to remove "distorting" influences so as to 
"free" marital decisions failed. The theory would remove the 
wife's risk that her investment would go unrewarded because of 
divorce, but it would impose on the husband almost the full risk 
that the wife's investment in her own career would to some de-
gree have failed. This dilemma appeared as well in The Theory's 
efforts to develop a model of undistorted marital decisions. The 
theory, as we saw, turned out to favor marital sharing intended 
to increase the family's income at the expense of other kinds of 
marital sharing and to promote maximizing the family's income 
instead of maximizing women's pursuit of careers in the 
marketplace. 
To make clearer and more concrete the potential number 
and scope of the often-irreconcilable goals of alimony, let me 
suggest some of the plenitude of goals we might rationally want 
to reach. One might believe, on a variety of theories, that ali-
mony should be awarded to alleviate the economic need of a 
spouse after divorce. One might seek, as The Theory does, to 
affect marital behavior through alimony rules. More specifically, 
one might wish to foster mutual trust, concern, and generosity. 
Or one might, on several grounds, strive to promote the auton-
omy of the two spouses after, or even while they are married. 
One might construct alimony law to maximize the degree of 
45. P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the 
Judicial Process and the Law, 65 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1250 (1980). 
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equality between the spouses after divorce. One might want a 
law of alimony that optimized the predictability of the law, so 
that at least the spouses could know what to expect if they got 
divorced and could plan accordingly and so that judicial deci-
sions could be made more accurately and efficiently. One might 
seek an alimony law that brought the relations of the parties to 
as complete an end as possible (which of course might mean no 
alimony at all or only something like rehabilitative alimony). 
One might write alimony rules that recompensed each spouse for 
any sacrifice he or she had made for the other. One might devise 
a law of alimony that prevented the disappointment of the fi-
nancial expectations one spouse had of the other. One might 
prefer a law of alimony which encouraged or even required 
spouses to enter into pre-divorce contractual agreements gov-
erning the handling of their financial affairs on divorce. One 
might want the law to award alimony according to the marital 
fault (traditionally understood or otherwise) of the parties. One 
might wish, for any number of reasons, to eliminate alimony al-
together. Obviously, not all these goals are by themselves suffi-
cient bases for a complete theory of alimony. But all of them are 
plausible and substantial goals. And it does not take much ex-
amination to see that they are far from being mutually compati-
ble (even though they are not all mutually incompatible).46 
In sum, alimony rules must affect marital decisions of the 
kind with which we are concerned, and those decisions have im-
portant moral dimensions. We thus must choose which kinds of 
decisions to promote, and thus we must ask what moral views of 
marriage we prefer. If we must choose between approaches with 
different moral consequences, better that we should consider 
those consequences as carefully as possible. The Theory does 
not profess to escape choices of this kind entirely. Indeed, at one 
point it claims to "generate[] alimony rules that encourage the 
kind of marital behavior we want" (p. 52). But it is half-hearted 
and ambivalent about doing so, and thus never asks what "kind 
of marital behavior we want" with enough persistence to yield 
persuasive and useful answers. Thus, while The Theory cogently 
argues in favor of making it safe for spouses to maximize their 
family's income, its desire for a morally neutral justification for 
46. I explore each of these possible goals in my forthcoming casebook-Carl E. 
Schneider, Family Law. 
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alimony deters it from sufficiently considering other desirable 
goals and from fully justifying the goal it does choose. 
That desire for a morally neutral justification for alimony 
also leads the theory into some uncomfortable if unintended re-
sults. Suppose that the theory were adopted and that it achieved 
the prominence a hortatory law must have to work well. What 
inferences might people draw from it? People seem likely to as-
sume that the theory rewards with alimony the behavior which 
the law particularly values and that it refuses thus to reward 
apparently similar behavior which it does not value.47 The the-
ory in fact rewards only "economically rational" behavior. It re-
wards only investments a "self-interested" bargainer would 
make. It expressly declines to reward otherwise identical sacri-
fices which a self-interested bargainer would not make. An in-
vestment made with an eye to getting something for yourself is 
protected; an investment made only to benefit someone else is 
not. I suspect, then, that people who had not read The Theory 
of Alimony would conclude that the law conceived of families in 
exclusively economic terms (rather than in a combination of eco-
nomic, social, psychological, and moral terms), that the law 
thought of spouses as separate bargainers and not as part of a 
marital entity, and that the law valued self-interest more than 
altruism. In these ways, the tlieory seems conducive to readings 
which I think many people would join me in regretting. Indeed, 
even the fact that the theory seems to suggest that sacrifices 
must be recompensed on divorce may undercut the sense that 
spouses ought to have of obligation to the family and each other 
and of love for each other which may itself be a sufficient basis 
for sacrifice. 48 
The theory obviously does not set out to send any such 
messages. Professor Ellman can reasonably say that the law of 
alimony surely ought not penalize spouses for their generosity to 
each other by refusing to take that generosity into account when 
setting alimony. It may be perverse that a theory designed to 
recompense a spouse for sacrifices should also seem to undercut 
an important basis for making sacrifices. But that perversity 
47. In fact, this is not the articulated basis for the theory. But as I argued earlier, 
that basis seems to me far too complex, sophisticated, and delicate ever to penetrate the 
public consciousness. 
48. For a thoughtful discussion of the problems with deploying the law's expressive 
function, see Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. Davis 
L. Rev. 991 (1989). 
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suggests once again how hard, even impossible, it is to find a 
morally neutral basis for the law of alimony. It also suggests 
again the complexities with which a theory of alimony based on 
the hortatory function must cope. 
C. Should Courts Be Barred from Considering the Spouse's 
Moral Relations in Awarding Alimony? 
I have been exploring ·some of the difficulties with the the-
ory's attempt to find a morally neutral basis for alimony. We 
will now examine its attempt to relieve courts of the burden of 
examining the moral relations of the parties in making alimony 
awards. Of course the extent to which a court needs to look at 
the moral relations of the parties will vary according to the the-
ory of alimony that is adopted. I cannot specify exactly what 
kind of moral discourse courts ought to undertake in alimony 
disputes until I present my own theory of alimony (and also of 
marital property), which I am not yet prepared to do. Here, I 
wish to argue against The Theory's position that courts should 
be barred from considering the spouses' moral relations in 
awarding alimony and in favor of the position that such an in-
quiry may sometimes be desirable. I will advance several reasons 
for these arguments. Centrally, I will observe that the people the 
law seeks to affect themselves think in moral terms. A law which 
tries to eliminate those terms from its language will both misun-
derstand the people it is regulating and be misunderstood by 
them. 
The Theory seeks to influence the way husbands and wives 
make decisions which have important economic consequences, 
and it seeks to analyze those decisions in economic terms. But 
husbands and wives do not make those decisions in purely eco-
nomic terms. They often take into account, sometimes very cen-
trally into account, the moral environment and consequences of 
their choices. As I have argued at some length, The Theory's 
economic analysis is repeatedly led astray by its attempt to ex-
clude these non-economic considerations from its calculus. In 
consequence, the theory is based on hortatory goals that cannot 
be met, on principles that cannot be wholly reconciled, and on 
calculations that cannot be satisfactorily made. 
Reducing moral discourse in alimony decisions not only 
leads the law to misunderstand families. It also leads families to 
misunderstand the law. Family law generally, and the law of ali-
mony and marital property particularly, try to regulate two of 
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the most intimate, complex, and consequential things in people's 
lives-their closest personal relations and their money. People 
want, and perhaps expect, such a law to make its decisions indi-
vidually and meticulously, giving its full attention to the whole 
situation in which the specific parties were acting and to the dif-
ferences between the specific parties and the rest of the world. 
Because morality matters deeply to most people, they will con-
sider their moral relations a central part of that full situation 
and those differences. In other words, the theory establishes a 
bright-line rule for deciding disputes over alimony. But that rule 
inhibits courts from making individualized decisions and taking 
the complete circumstances of the case into account in a cate-
gory of cases in which those circumstances will seem specially 
relevant to the litigants. 
The point is not just that people legitimately expect that 
their deepest relationships will not be dissolved and their life's 
assets will not be distributed in so procrustean a fashion. It is 
that, in a world in which most people cannot be persuaded to 
study the law of alimony closely while they are married, the law 
should stay in touch with the concerns of the people it affects so 
that their reasonable expectations about the law are not disap-
pointed. Spouses are likely to assume that the law of alimony 
will attempt to do some kind of justice among the parties, taking 
their full situation into account. Insofar as spouses take law into 
account in making decisions, they are likely to shape their mari-
tal behavior according to such a view of the law. Where there are 
not strong indications to the contrary, there is much to be said 
for accommodating those views. 
Another obstacle to eliminating moral discourse from family 
law is that there are important reasons for wanting to retain it. 
The family is a central social institution which affects people in 
many of the most basic aspects of their lives. The obligations 
family members assume to each other, then, will have important 
social consequences, consequences in which the law has a legiti-
mate interest. The legitimacy of that interest is testified to by 
the fact that, although both sides of the political spectrum vigor-
ously assert that families have a basic claim to freedom from 
government regulation, both sides also regularly find occasions 
when that claim should yield to social interests. Thus some peo-
ple on the right argue in favor of traditional alimony rules partly 
on the ground that they strengthen the family by enforcing the 
obligations and the sense of obligation family members are 
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taken to.owe each other. And thus some people on the left argue 
in favor either of restricting alimony (for example, by making 
alimony available only for rehabilitative purposes) or of ex-
panding alimony (for example, by making alimony available in 
the kind of ways advanced by The Theory) as a means of pro-
moting women's moral claims to autonomy and self-sufficiency. 
Indeed, at several points The Theory itself defends its alimony 
rules on the ground that they "encourage the kind of marital 
behavior we want" (p. 52). Thus the theory seeks to promote 
"marital sharing" (of some kinds), and it specially rewards in-
vestments in child rearing partly on the grounds that it is "not 
merely a life-style preference but a traditional ideal" (p. 72). 
The social interest in alimony which has traditionally had 
special weight has to do with another of the law's functions-the 
protective function.49 It is a basic function of law to protect citi-
zens against harms done them by their fellows. Because spouses 
do and should be able to depend on each other, and because 
spouses are for that and other reasons peculiarly vulnerable to 
each other, spouses can easily and severely injure each other in 
many ways. Alimony has traditionally been understood to be one 
way in which the law protects former spouses from the financial 
component of such injuries. Since those financial injuries can be 
devastating, this social purpose ought not be easily discarded. 
And it is a purpose which can be best served where the law un-
dertakes the moral inquiry into whether such an injury has been 
done. 
I have been principally suggesting that we must consider 
the moral relations of the parties if the law of alimony is to serve 
the hortatory and protective functions satisfactorily. I now wish 
to suggest that those moral relations must be considered when 
the law of alimony performs the dispute-settlement function. It 
is the heart of that function to settle disputes fairly. The moral 
relations between the spouses will be an important factor in 
thinking about what is fair, and therefore should be considered 
by courts. Suppose, for example, that a wife makes an invest-
ment of the kind the theory protects, and that in return she ex-
acts important non-economic concessions from her husband. 
Suppose further that the wife subsequently divorces her hus-
band for reasons that cannot be attributed to him. Under the 
theory, a court could consider only the wife's investment; it 
49. I analyze this function in detail in Carl E. Schneider, Family Law (forthcoming). 
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could not consider what the husband gave in return or that he 
was not responsible for the wife's failure to receive the long-term 
economic benefit from her investment. But under these circum-
stances, is it fair to require the husband to protect her invest-
ment after divorce in the form of alimony? The unfairness of the 
result in this hypothetical is suggested by the extent to which it 
shows how the theory departs from its own rationale. The theory 
seeks to provide the wife the contract she would have negotiated 
had it been practical for her to do so. Yet the theory denies the 
husband the benefits that contract would have provided 
him-protection for the consideration he supplied and freedom 
from paying damages where he did not breach the contract. 
One indication of the drawbacks of analyzing alimony in 
non-moral terms is that Professor Ellman's theory itself is more 
persuasively stated and its drawbacks are better understood in 
moral terms. Much of w;hat makes that theory attractive is that 
it accords with some widely held moral ideas. The theory is ap-
pealing because it summons to mind and appropriately resolves 
a paradigm case in which the wife has powerful moral claims on 
her husband. This paradigm case has a number of features. In it, 
the wife makes a genuine, deliberate, irreparable sacrifice of her 
interest in pursuing a career and of her earning power. She also 
provides services (especially child-rearing and housekeeping) 
which she does not wholly relish and which are socially less pres-
tigious than her husband's employment. She makes the sacrifice 
partly because of social pressures to do so, social pressures which 
both encourage her to "serve" her family and discourage her 
from pursuing a career. The husband does not just acquiesce in 
this decision; he at least expects and perhaps demands it. The 
husband's interest in pursuing a career and his earning power 
are directly, deeply, and indelibly benefitted by the sacrifice. 
The wife sacrifices in the belief that the marriage is permanent, 
or at least in the expectation that both parties will earnestly 
strive to make it so. 
When the divorce comes, it is (in this paradigm case) the 
husband's "fault," if only in the sense that the husband, as the 
more powerful spouse, had greater responsibility for the success 
of the marriage. When the couple is divorced, the woman bears 
the heavier burdens of raising the children, with less ability to 
enter the job market because of those burdens, with less earning 
ability because of the sacrifice she made, with less ability than 
she once had and than her husband presently has to find a 
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spouse, 110 with little property (if only because most divorcing 
couples have little property to divide), with child-support pay-
ments which are set low and which are hard to collect, and with, 
in consequence of all this, a diminished social and economic po-
sition which will seem hard to improve. Her husband, on the 
other hand, is freed of the daily drudgeries of parenthood, re-
tains the advantages in pursuing a career and earning a living 
which his wife's sacrifice gave him, and experiences little dimi-
nution and perhaps even an improvement in his social and eco-
nomic position. The wife is in need, in several senses. She may 
be in absolute need-she may have fallen below the poverty line. 
She will at least be in need relative to her former social position. 
And she will be in need relative to her husband. Relatively, the 
husband is less likely to be in need and may be able to help his 
(former) wife supply her needs. 
The force of the paradigm case largely arises from the per-
sonal and moral relationship between the husband and wife. It 
arises from the belief that she was weak and he was strong and 
that he took advantage of her weakness and his strength. It 
arises from the belief that she made a sacrifice for him and he 
made none for her. It arises from the sense that the parties had 
made a life-long commitment to love and care for each other, 
and that the wife kept that commitment while the husband 
evaded it. The legal terms in which the paradigm case is most 
appealingly resolved are some of those that are most charged 
with moral ideas and that reflect the kinds of concerns about the 
paradigm case that I have just described-ideas like unjust en-
richment, restitution, reliance, and possibly even contract. And 
the best explanation for why the husband might owe the wife 
alimony will arise from the moral consequences of their moral 
relations. 
It is then not surprising that The Theory is most persuasive 
where it does not require us to ignore the moral relations of the 
parties. Thus The Theory succeeds best where it explores the 
financial relations between the husband and wife in something 
like the paradigm case and where it shows in careful detail the 
economic consequences of the wife's sacrifice and the analysis 
she would undertake were she only a rational economic actor. 
50. This is a point which Professor Ellman develops with some care. I have not dealt 
with it, however, because Professor Ellman concludes that any remedy for a loss of mar-
riage prospects "requires a different theoretical exercise than the one advanced here" (p. 
81). 
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, When it does this, The Theory does much to help us understand 
what the moral relations of the parties are and thus what the 
legal relations of the parties should be. 
Correspondingly, The Theory is less successful in two other 
circumstances. The first is where it attempts to justify denying 
alimony in something like the paradigm case. For example, its 
explanation of why a wife who makes a financially irrational sac-
rifice does not receive the same protection as a wife who makes 
an identical but economically rational sacrifice seems unpersua-
sive, and it seems so in part because it ignores the moral reasons 
we might want to require the husband to pay alimony. We might 
want to require him to do so because he has induced his wife to 
enrich him at her expense where the "confidential" relationship 
between husband and wife made that behavior morally dubious. 
In some circumstances we might want to require the husband to 
do so because of the wife's need. Professor Ellman says, and he 
is right, that we cannot require one person to support another 
simply because that person can afford to provide support and 
the other needs it. But people who have taken on obligations to 
live together for life (or at least to struggle to do so), whose lives 
have become intertwined, and who have come by mutual consent 
to rely on each other in special ways, may also become responsi-
ble for each other after marriage. 
I want to dwell on this point for a moment. In his article in 
this symposium, Professor Ellman says that" '[n]eed' has never 
been a satisfactory explanation for alimony, since it begs the 
question of why the needy person's former spouse . . . should be 
liable to meet that need .... "51 But the traditional law of ali-
mony was not so mindless that it failed to answer that question. 
Nor ought that answer be understood simply in terms of gender 
roles or of marital fault narrowly understood. Rather, that an-
swer, put in gender neutral terms, was the explanation I articu-
lated in the preceding paragraph: One spouse may come to owe 
the other support after marriage because of the moral relation-
ships between spouses that are generally part of marriage. In 
short, the riddle of alimony has a traditional answer. It is not 
that need gives rise to obligation. It is that entering into the spe-
cial relationship that is marriage and behaving in some kinds of 
51. Ira Mark Ellman, Should Nonfinancial Losses and Motivations be Included in 
the Theory of Alimony?, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 259, 262. 
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ways in that relationship can give rise to an obligation to a for-
mer spouse who is in need. 
I have been saying that the first circumstance in which The 
Theory is least convincing is where it attempts to justify deny-
ing alimony in something like my paradigm case. The second 
such circumstance is where it attempts to justify requiring ali-
mony in something unlike the paradigm case. I have asked a 
number of questions about the theory based on significant varia-
tions on the paradigm: I have, for instance, asked why the wife 
whose "investment" was neither a sacrifice nor even what we 
would ordinarily recognize as an investment should receive ali-
mony and why the wife who received a full return (or even more 
than a full return) on her investment in the form of enhanced 
family income or reciprocal sharing should receive alimony. 
These questions suppose that the moral relations between the 
parties are more complicated than The Theory assumes. To 
some extent, these questions even raise the possibility that to 
impose alimony on the husband would be morally problematic. 
The Theory's answers to these questions are crucially limited by 
its desire to escape moral issues. 
The Theory proffers several reasons for excluding inquiries 
into the moral relations between the parties. These reasons are 
substantial and deserve attention. The first is that the "modern 
divorce reform movement" has rejected all fault reasoning. But 
it is not so clear that it has or that it should. Historically, there 
was probably never a considered decision to reject all fault rea-
soning in all aspects of divorce law. When no-fault divorce was 
presented to legislatures, it was treated to a surprising degree as 
an issue primarily of interest to lawyers and even as an almost 
technical problem in judicial administration. Thus the full im-
plications of no-fault divorce were not explored even by those 
who were involved in the adoption of the reform, and the public 
at large was hardly aware even of the limited debate that did 
occur.112 
52. Herbert Jacob, A Silent Revolution: Routine Policy Making and the Transfor-
mation of Divorce Law in the United Stat~s (1988). (For a precis of Professor Jacob's 
themes, see Carl E. Schneider, Legislatures and Legal Change: The Reform of Divorce 
Law, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1121 (1988)). As Professor Wardle writes, 
The adoption of no-fault divorce grounds was intended primarily to reduce the 
acrimony of divorce proceedings, eliminate a major incentive for perjury, close 
the 'gap' between the written divorce law and the law as actually enforced and 
reflect the modern notion that charging and proving marital misconduct should 
not be necessary to obtain a divorce when the parties have mutually agreed to 
250 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1991 
Quite apart from what may historically have been intended 
in the move toward no-fault divorce, present practice does not in 
fact wholly abandon "fault" reasoning. Some jurisdictions today 
expressly allow fault to be taken into account in considering ali-
mony and child custody. Many jurisdictions directly require 
courts to ask what is "equitable" when dividing the spouses' 
property, a requirement which seems expressly to invite some 
kind of inquiry into their moral relations. For that matter, a 
number of jurisdictions retain fault grounds for divorce along 
with no-fault grounds. 
' Nor does it logically follow from the adoption of no-fault 
divorce that fault cannot be taken into account in setting ali-
mony. As I recently wrote, 
Fault was eliminated as a basis for divorce partly because it 
was thought that people could not usefully be made to live to-
gether if they did not want to, whatever their moral relation-
ship. However, in deciding what financial obligations the par-
ties continue to have to each other after the marriage is ended, 
enforcement problems become less severe and the moral rela-
tionship may well be relevant. Indeed, that relevance seems to 
be conceded by the usual direction to the court to make 
whatever distribution of property and income may be thought 
to be "right," or "justifiable," or "equitable." It may be true 
that another reason for no-fault divorce was legislative reluc-
tance to exacerbate the tensions between the parties by dis-
cussing painful subjects, but such discussions as to alimony 
should have fewer consequences, given that divorce has already 
been decided on. Indeed, to ignore the moral relationship be-
tween the parties in setting alimony awards can itself exacer-
bate tensions. Further, as Professor Miiller-Freienfels points 
out, "there are more possibilities, in practice, of mitigating 
fault, and reducing its impact; so as to permit compromises" 
when dealing with alimony.113 
Even if no-fault divorce was intended to mean all that The 
Theory takes it to mean, we may still ask whether that is what it 
ought to mean. We need not restore the status quo ante; suffi-
cient unto that day was the evil thereof. But it may be profitable 
divorce. 
Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 79, 80. 
53. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 
83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1810-11, n.12 (1985), quoting Muller-Freienfels, The Marriage 
Law Reform of 1976 in the Federal Republic of Germany, 28 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 184, 195 
(1979). 
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to do what we have not yet done-to look carefully and critically 
at the implications of interpreting no-fault divorce as reading 
moral discourse out of each area of divorce law. 
The Theory's second reason for excluding inquiries into the 
moral relations of the parties is that there is so much social disa-
greement about modern marital relations that we have no stan-
dards by which to judge them. There is plainly something to this 
argument. The point is not just that groups in society will disa-
gree with each other about those standards; it is also that even a 
particular individual will often want conflicting things of mar-
riage. But I do not think this argument should be taken too far. 
For one thing, it is not clear to me that there is in fact as much 
conflict about what marriage should be as The Theory seems to 
suggest, or that the conflict about marriage that exists would 
necessarily cripple attempts to take moral problems into account 
in writing alimony rules. In any event, there is social disagree-
ment about all important areas of public policy. The processes 
of democratic government exist to resolve those disagreements. 
They are available to resolve uncertainties about the moral obli-
gations of spouses. 114 
The Theory's third justification for avoiding moral dis-
course (and, of course, one of the justifications for no-fault di-
vorce) is that it "would require [an] ... impractical inquiry into 
spousal understandings ... " (p. 64). This is no doubt true and 
no doubt important. Yet I have been arguing that it can also be 
impractical and unjust not to make those inquiries. Which evil 
ought we prefer? There may not be a really good way of decid-
ing. But the law's usual resolution of this quandary (which is 
hardly unique to family law) is probably to rely on the parties 
and the adversary system to illuminate the evidence as fully as 
possible and to rely on the fact-finder to reach the best decision 
it can. That best decision will often be imprecise and inelegant, 
but it may also more regularly work a better justice than any of 
the alternatives. Although I am not firmly convinced, I am in-
clined to think that, all things considered, this may be a better 
solution for the law of alimony than such procrustean rules as 
The Theory advocates. 
That solution is also, I suspect, likely to be what, in princi-
54. I discuss the problem of social dissensus and standards for resolving family-law 
disputes at length in Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child-Custody Deci-
sions and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 Mich. L. Rev. __ (1991). 
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ple, at least, most parties to divorce actions would want. As I 
argued above, husbands and wives think of their relations partly 
in moral terms, and they will find it hard to understand a law 
which ignores so important an aspect of their relations. And all 
litigants want courts to take the particular facts of their situa-
tion into account. The effect of approaches like The Theory's is 
that individualized justic·e is denied and that bright-line rules 
are substituted for it. ·The theory's is a bright-line rule for two 
reasons. First, a wife is entitled to alimony as long as she has 
made a particular kind of marital investment, even though 
awarding her alimony would not be necessary to promote the 
ends of alimony and even though there might be strong equita-
ble arguments against awarding her alimony. Second, a wife who 
has not made that kind of investment is not entitled to alimony 
even though awarding her alimony would promote the ends of 
alimony and even though there might be strong equitable argu-
ments for awarding her alimony. 
To be sure, there are powerful arguments for bright-line 
rules, but I doubt that they apply forcefully in this context. 
Bright-line rules may usually be desirable where the law's pur-
pose is hortatory, since they will often communicate the law's 
intent and content more clearly than more complicated and less 
emphatic alternatives. However, bright-line rules will often be 
less suitable where the law's purpose is to resolve disputes, since, 
even more than most rules, they will prevent the decision-maker 
from considering factors that are relevant to a fair decision. This 
drawback will be specially pronounced where, as in alimony, the 
dispute is between people whose relations are intricately com-
plex and whose whole lives and fortunes seem so nearly at stake. 
I think it is probably true that my broader view of alimony 
could not be reduced to a few rules, that it would require courts 
to exercise some significant (but not unfettered) degree of dis-
cretion. I suspect that that exercise of discretion is part of what 
Professor Ellman seeks to avoid. And I sympathize with that im-
pulse. Whether it is safe to confide decisions about alimony im-
portantly (but not exclusively) to judicial discretion seems to me 
a question which deserves its own article, since I believe that the 
choice between rules and discretion is both intricately complex 
and context-specific. Here I can only say that I am led by my 
investigation of judicial discretion in child -custody cases to 
doubt that the risks of discretion are as uniformly and over-
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whelmingly great as is often supposed. 55 Allowing discretion to 
guide decisions is at least not a radical position. The traditional 
standards for alimony were vague enough to allow a good deal of 
judicial discretion. And although the Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act limits judicial discretion to grant alimony, it accords 
lavish discretion to judges in the related (on some views almost 
identical) question of deciding how the spouses' property should 
be divided. 56 
I should stress that The Theory's arguments for rejecting 
moral discourse are weighty. But for the reasons I have just 
presented, I do not believe they are dispositive or that they 
clearly outweigh the countervailing arguments in favor of such 
discourse in alimony law. As I have argued, no morally neutral 
basis for alimony law can be found, the behavior of spouses can-
not be understood without looking to their moral relations, 
spouses expect that courts will take those relations into account 
in making decisions about alimony, there are social reasons we 
might not want a morally neutral law of alimony, and courts 
resolving disputes between divorcing couples should attempt to 
do so individually and justly. 
In any event, moral discourse in the law of alimony has 
been made less problematic by recent developments in family 
law. The conventional means by which the law attempts to avoid 
dealing with the moral relations of parties is to allow people to 
enter into contracts and thereby to settle their moral relations 
for themselves. Family law has become increasingly receptive to 
contract as a mode of ordering marital relations. Thus couples 
who do not wish to have courts consult their moral relations in 
awarding alimony might be allowed to write their own contracts 
specifying what economic obligations they would have to each 
other on divorce. While I agree with Professor Ellman that mari-
tal contracts generally present serious problems,57 I wonder 
55. Id. 
56. It will no doubt be said that judicial discretion in awarding alimony was abused. 
This is a question that can be answered only with empirical information which we now 
lack. However, I would ask whether discretion was in fact being abused or whether it was 
simply being exercised in ways that were once acceptable but no longer are. I would also 
ask whether undesirable kinds of decisions about alimony can be identified and specifi-
cally prohibited, thereby preserving the advantages of some degree of discretion while 
preventing some of the most serious and systematic misuses of it. For more such ques-
tions, see id., passim. 
57. I treat some of these problems and a host of the other drawbacks of contractual-
izing family law in Carl E. Schneider, Family Law (forthcoming). 
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whether they are as acute in the context of the theory as he as-
sumes. Professor Ellman believes the wife cannot protect herself 
contractually as the parts supplier can. He reasons that, because 
of the "indefinite nature of the parties' marital obligations," the 
"[p]rospective spouses will usually be unable to specify the de-
tails of their marital obligations sufficiently to permit objective 
determinations of breach" (pp. 44-45). But this seems to assume 
that any contract would be one which tried to regulate all the 
couple's affairs. Might not the couple, for example, contract at 
the time of the marriage or of the sacrifice to a private version of 
Professor Ellman's alimony scheme, thereby protecting the wife 
at least as fully as judicial adoption of Professor Ellman's theory 
of alimony would? It may be hard for the couples to foresee how 
the theory's kind of alimonial relief would work in their own fu-
ture situation, but The Theory is already willing to impose such 
relief on every couple. That seems to suggest that the foresee-
ability problem is not, in this particular instance, forbiddingly 
great. If it is acceptable to have the state provide alimonial relief 
of the kind the theory contemplates in every case, would it not 
also be acceptable to have couples adopt that form of relief for 
their own particular case? If the wife's interest in protecting the 
kind of investment The Theory treats is great enough to be the 
only basis for alimony, is it not also great enough for couples to 
make it the basis for a contractual agreement either before the 
marriage or at the time of the investment? 
Finally, moral discourse in the law of alimony may also 
seem somewhat less troublesome if we recall that most divorce 
cases are settled by the parties. (The usual estimate is that only 
about ten percent are actually litigated.) For those couples who 
settle their disputes out of court, the formal inquiry into their 
moral relationship need never happen. True, they may negotiate 
"in the shadow of the law." But it is far from clear just how 
much that shadow actually affects negotiations. And any such 
effect will be diminished where, as seems likely in the case of 
alimony, the message of the law's shadow cannot be interpreted 
with any real certainty. And if I am right that moral issues will 
be relevant to whether alimony should be awarded and that the 
parties themselves will have moral issues centrally in mind, it 
will not take the law's shadow to lead the parties to those 
issues. 58 
58. I discuss the law's effect on bargaining at divorce at some length in my forth-
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V. CoNCLUSION 
In the end, I wonder whether The Theory of Alimony in 
fact answers the riddle of alimony. The riddle is why one spouse 
owes the other support after divorce. The Theory's answer is 
that one spouse (let us continue to call her the wife) has suffered 
a loss. But why is the husband responsible for repairing that 
loss? The Theory does not find the reason in the fact that he in 
some sense caused the loss or that he benefitted from it and 
should have to disgorge that benefit. On the contrary, the theory 
rejects any such inquiry into the relations of the spouses. 
Rather, the theory finds its reason for alimony in the law's hor-
tatory function, in the need to remove disincentives to a particu-
lar kind of marital sharing. 
But is this justification for alimony persuasive? Why should 
one spouse be singled out to pay perhaps considerable sums in 
order to support a general system of incentives? In the criminal 
law, we do something that may be analogous. That is, we justify 
punishment partly on the grounds of its contribution to general 
deterrence. But thus singling out one person to bear the dispro-
portionate costs of a social program seems less problematic in 
the criminal law (although it is hardly unproblematic even 
there), since the person being singled out has done something 
wrong and has subjected himself to punishment. But whether 
the spouse who is made to pay alimony under the theory has 
done anything at all to justify using him in this way is a ques-
tion the theory prevents us even from asking. In other words, I 
have the same problem with the theory's focus on loss that the 
theory has with the law's focus on need: Why is the former 
spouse singled out to bear the burden? 
If The Theory does answer the riddle, I wonder whether it 
does so by changing the question the riddle asks. Alimony is 
conventionally understood to mean the support one spouse pro- . 
vides another after divorce. But The Theory strips away from 
alimony all payments except those necessary to restore to the 
wife any loss of earning capacity she may have suffered from a 
sacrifice of earning capacity made as a rational means of maxi-
mizing the family's wealth. The theory may be correct, but is 
what it justifies alimony? Not in our conventional understanding 
of that term, at least. 
coming casebook. ld. 
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I almost wonder something else. I almost wonder whether 
what Professor Ellman has done is not so much to expound a 
theqry of alimony but rather to destroy all theories of alimony. 
He attacks all the standard rationales for alimony: the tradi-
tional, the contractual, and the partnership explanations all fall 
beneath his sword. He can justify only one very narrow form of 
alimony, a form which hardly seems like alimony at all. And, as I 
have tried to show, even that form of alimony is multiplicitously 
problematic: it is hard to see how it will have a real effect on 
incentives, it is not clear that its incentives will operate as they 
are intended to, it involves cruelly complex and speculative cal-
culations, and it will regularly produce (too many?) unfair re-
sults. Essentially, Professor Ellman argues that there is no judi-
cially manageable market measure for most marital transactions. 
I have argued that the one kind of marital transaction which 
Professor Ellman is willing to see consulted in setting alimony is 
subject to that same criticism and that that transaction cannot 
in any case be fairly evaluated without evaluating the kinds of 
transactions Professor Ellman would exclude. Thus I think it is 
reasonable to ask whether the game is worth the candle, to ask 
whether so diminished and distorted a form of alimony is worth 
the many costs it would impose. 
The abolition of alimony is certainly not unthinkable. If 
there is no satisfactory rationale for alimony, alimony should be 
abolished. At least in modern times, alimony has never been 
awarded frequently. Its scope is currently being restricted, as 
doctrines like rehabilitative alimony signify. Its scope will always 
be limited in many cases by the inability of either spouse to con-
tribute to the support of the other. And some of alimony's func-
tions could still be served (and probably are now served) 
through the divorce court's power to divide the spouses' prop-
erty (and, for that matter, to order child support). 
The abolition of alimony could be conceived of yet more 
sweepingly. Divorce courts could be directed to do nothing more 
than to allocate the property of the spouses to the spouse who 
had title to the property and to enforce any contracts into which 
the spouses had entered. Every time the spouses acquired prop-
erty and decided whose name to put it in, they would be making 
a decision about its disposition on divorce. Spouses could make 
gifts to each other of property. They could dictate the allocation 
of their property on divorce through ante-nuptial agreements, 
through express contracts made during the marriage, or in set-
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tlement agreements negotiated during divorce proceedings. This 
would have the effect of maximizing the spouses' freedom to ar-
range their affairs and of reducing judicial power to a probable 
minimum. In an important sense, then, this is probably the most 
"neutral" system which could be adopted. 
This already over-long disquisition on Professor Ellman's 
theory of alimony is hardly the place to advance a fresh solution 
to the alimony riddle. 119 And I have more ambivalences than so-
lutions to offer. But I am dubious about the abolition of ali-
mony. I am dubious first because I am reluctant to see the law 
promote the view of marriage that I think most people would 
associate with the abolition of alimony. That view of marriage 
would emphasize the separateness of the spouses rather than 
their unity. It would emphasize their autonomy from each other 
rather than their obligations to each other. I am also dubious 
because I think that there will too often be times when fairness 
between the parties will demand that one of them assume some 
continuing responsibility for the support of the other. To put 
the point differently, I think there will be times when the law's 
protective function demands that spouses be guarded against 
the financial injuries to which they are specially vulnerable. 
In sum, I suspect that the riddle of alimony already has an 
answer. That answer lies in the traditional justification for ali-
mony which I described earlier-that people who marry take on 
special responsibilities for each other because of the commit-
ment that defines marriage and because of the commitments 
that grow out of a shared life. That answer is hardly a complete 
answer. It remains to be said what commitments are instinct in 
marriage, what commitments made during marriage should have 
legal consequences, and what responsibilities those commit-
ments give rise to. The task before us, then, is to ask what we 
want of marriage as a social institution. For we cannot adopt a 
theory of alimony until we construct a theory of marriage. 
59. I explore the possible rationales for alimony in some detail in Carl E. Schneider, 
Family Law (forthcoming). 
